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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Southeast Asia is experiencing tremendous changes both politically and 
economically.  Religious and ethnic issues have increased significantly.  The move away 
from traditional to modern systems creates a degree of instability, eroding the existing 
system’s socioeconomic and politico-psychological tenets, giving rise to counter-elites 
and opposition groups, and paving the way for a resurgence of racial terrorism and ethnic 
animosities.  
Although unfamiliar with insurgencies, Southeast Asia, long considered the 
“Islamic periphery” owing to its moderate Islamic stance, pluralism and nationalism, is 
facing a more complex challenge.  The root causes of terrorism, both domestic and 
international, are varied and complex.  Some factors are essentially ideological, 
economical and include religious and ethno-nationalistic extremism. 
An adequate response requires counter-terrorist policies to interact with broader 
foreign policy.  To be effective, counter-terrorism demands understanding the terrorist’s 
psychology, motivation and goals.  Multilateral diplomatic efforts such as the Association 
of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) or the ASEAN Regional Forum (AFR) assist in 
forging substantive agreements that will enhance the sharing of information, tighten 
border agreements, and reinforce law enforcement cooperation.  For example, the United 
States-ASEAN joint declaration on counter-terrorism, among other goals, pledges to 
share intelligence, block terrorist funds, tighten borders, and crack down on forged travel 
documents. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism, drugs, organized crime, and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction are global concerns that transcend national boundaries 
and undermine economic stability and political stability in many countries. 
President William J. Clinton 
 
Viewed from either the global or regional perspective, Southeast Asia provides a 
disappointing picture in every social, economic, and political context.  This is based on 
the fact that Southeast Asia is almost perpetually plagued by various intra-and interstate 
conflicts and crises stemming from myopic attitudes of largely illiterate masses and the 
weak approach the ruling elite adopts toward resolving problems.  Virtually every 
Southeast Asia country’s progress is hindered by internal conflicts and crises based on 
narrow considerations of caste, religion, ethnicity, language and community.  This 
distorts the national integrity/unity and the overall order of the effected state.  Moreover, 
a constant and often excessive preoccupation with domestic problem renders some states 
highly vulnerable to external threats and interference, which also challenge their 
sovereignty and consequently also challenges their legitimacy.  In other words, the 
persistence of multifarious problems, both within and between the Southeast Asian states, 
hamper the sustaining of an environment wherein the basic essential needs of the 
common good are fulfilled.                    
Since the end of the Cold War, threats to international security have become less 
direct and apocalyptic.  Today threats are more diffuse and insidious.  The international 
community through the 1990’s and into the next millennium faces a set of challenges that 
is as complex as it is novel.  With the probability of the large-scale, high-intensity 
conflicts decreasing, terrorism and transitional organized crime constitute the most 
serious and most likely threats.  Religious fanaticism, ethnic-nationalist conflicts, 
political ideologies, wide- spread poverty, unemployment, and social alienation are 
factors that have always propelled individuals and groups into terrorist campaigns.  
A transnational threat can only be met with a transnational response.  The internal 
security of an affected nation no longer ends where the sovereignty of this very nation 
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starts.  In the attempt to combat the transnational phenomena of international organized 
crime and terrorism, the international security requires an improved transnational 
dimension. 
Most of Southeast Asia is a developing region, typified by a lack of maturity in 
promulgating national, regional, and international policy.  This region is vulnerable in 
facing global changes.  In contrast, advanced societies of today are, to a great extent, 
dependent on the electronic storage, retrieval, analysis, and transmission of information.  
The amount of data in this process increases daily.  The possibilities of disruption of 
information systems through viruses or electronic sabotage and the ability of groups 
(especially Mafia-type and terrorist groups) to obtain funds by electronically penetrating 
system (in an attempt to obtain information on possible targets) opens up the dimension 
of terrorists using information warfare.  This condition jeopardizes Southeast Asia as a 
whole.  The data shows that terrorism remains a serious threat in many countries, not 
surprisingly, given that the underlying causes of the bitter ethnic and religious struggles 
that spawn terrorism remain unresolved.  Since the World Trade Center attack of 
September 11, 2001, international terrorists have proven that they have become the real 
threats to humanity.  Many countries have taken various defensive actions, but with little 
effect.  This failure was confirmed when only a year later terrorists committed a deadly 
act in the Bali bombing of October 12, 2002.  The data show that from January 1999 to 
February 2003, Indonesia endured 15 bomb attacks in various important places.1 
In order to explain the rationale for such alliances, this analysis will explore the 
following questions: 
• What are the characteristics and means of transnational terrorism (Al-
Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiah)? 
• What appropriate counterstrategies can meet such transnational threats? 
While the face and origins of terrorism have changed over time, for a long period 
its essential aims and techniques have changed little, that is: “Kill one-frighten a 
thousand.”  Southeast Asia is the region where rapid economical and political changes 
have arisen with simultaneous advancements in communications and technology.  These 
developments not only stimulate closer contacts with global markets, but also facilitate 
                                                 
1 Indonesian White Paper, “Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21,” pp. 31-32. 
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linkage between criminal organizations and joint ventures, namely al-Qaeda terrorism 
and the Jemaah Islamiah network.  The terrorists’ belief that they can use and exploit 
computers and telecommunications technology for criminal activities has increased 
dramatically.  Any kind of cooperation and counter–strategy ultimately will depend upon 
the willingness of governments to allocate both human and financial resources to combat 
and to prevent transnational terrorism and organized crime.  By considering the grave 
threat that transnational organized crime poses to world security, the international 
community must begin to develop procedural and operational mechanisms to combat the 
problem on an adequate scale. 
In Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and the Philippines, separatist and 
extremist groups use terrorism because it is much more effective in undermining fragile 
governments.  The United States has moral obligations to assist these fragile governments 
in defeating terrorism.  However, in providing military and financial assistance to 
Southeast Asian governments, the United States must strike a balance between U.S. 
national interests in the short-term cooperation in the war against terror, and the long-
term goal of developing viable governments that respect and uphold human rights and the 
democracy norm.        
The September 11th and the Bali bombing seemed to clarify the goals of the 
counterterrorist mission-preventing harm against innocent civilians by eliminating 
terrorist attacks.  However, this appears to invite a narrow focus for U.S. and Southeast 
Asian countries’ counterterrorism policy in that success or failure is determined simply 
by body counts, whether it is that of the guilty or that of the innocent.  However, reality is 
not so clearly defined.  Political or economic pressure can change the behavior of 
government, which in turn eliminates the rationale for a group to pursue terrorism.  In 
this case, counterterrorism must be viewed as a multifaceted instrument that may not 
necessarily realize immediate results.  In dealing with international terrorism, 
counterterrorist policies must be afforded a prominent place in the overall U.S. and 
Southeast Asia countries’ foreign policy.      
The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine terrorism in Southeast Asia, with 
particular attention paid toward terrorism conducted by separatist groups in Indonesia and 
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the Philippines.  Furthermore, this thesis will discuss what actions are needed to contain 
counter-terrorism in the region.  Additionally, this thesis will examine the U.S. 
government anti-terrorist/counterterrorist policy and how that policy is affected by 
growing political terrorism in the region. 
In order to respond to the thesis question, I will apply the methodology of 
research theory and explore what recent problems are facing Southeast Asia.  First, I will 
examine research about the political issues that leverage the development of the national 
and regional security.  Secondly, to support the analysis, it is necessary to compare the 
economic development and political affairs in Southeast Asia while paying prominent 
attention to Indonesia and the Philippines.  Finally, my analysis will focus on the main 
cause of transnational terrorism with respect to Al-Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiah and how 
to best counter it.  To counter transnational terrorism in Southeast Asia, I will explore and 
compare national, regional and international policy, particularly focusing on the U.S. 
policy.  
A. ABOUT DEFINITIONS:  TERRORISM IS DIFFICULT TO DEFINE  
While the problem posed by terrorism has received serious global attention, the 
international community has not yet formulated a uniform definition of terrorism.  The 
saying, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” remains a common 
perspective on the definitional problem of terrorism.  Foreign relations even indicate that 
“though most people can recognize terrorism when they see it, experts have had difficulty 
coming up with an ironclad definition.” 
The Terrorist Research Center admits that terrorism “by nature is difficult to 
define”.  The following definitions are provided by various experts in the field: 
• Terrorism is the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or 
property to further political or social objectives.  It is usually intended to 
intimidate or coerce a government, individual or groups, to modify their 
behavior or politics. -Vice President Task Force, 1986. 
• Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against a person or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government, civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. -FBI 
Definition. 
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• Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem, 
and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to 
gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience. -
James M. Poland. 
• Terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political 
objective when innocent people are targeted. -Walter Laqueur. 
• Terrorism is the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about 
political change.-Brian Jenkins.  
Paul Pillar, a former CIA deputy Chief of the Counterterrorism Center defines 
terrorism in the context of four elements: 
• It is premeditated and planned in advance, rather than an impulsive act  of 
rage, 
• It is political-not criminal, like the violence that groups such as the Mafia 
use to get money, but designed to change the existing political order, 
• It is aimed at civilians-not military targets or combat-ready troops, 
• It is carried out by sub-national groups not by the army of country.2  
The U.S. definition of terrorism, despite its inadequate conceptualizations, have 
influenced many scholars and analysts.  For example, Dr. Boaz Ganor, an Israeli expert 
on terrorism, defines terrorism as the intentional use of, or threatened use of violence 
against civilians or against civilian targets in order to attain political aims3.  
In an attempt to clarify the term terrorism, Ganor differentiates guerrilla warfare 
from terrorism and briefly defines the state’s involvement in terrorism. 
On the issue of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, Ganor contends that the two 
concepts serve as “alternative designations of the same phenomena.”  However, he 
emphasizes that “the term terrorism has a far more negative connotation, seemingly 
requiring one to take a stand, whereas the term guerrilla warfare is perceived as neutral 
and carries a more positive connotation.”4  If terrorism purposely targets civilians in 
order to achieve political goals, Ganor regards guerrilla warfare as “purposeful targeting 
of military personnel and military installations in order to achieve a political goal.” 
                                                 
2 Quoted in Council on Foreign Relations, “Terrorism: An Introduction” at 
[http://www.terrorsimanswers.com/introduction.html], Accessed on March 3, 2003. 
3 Boaz Ganor, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” at 
[http://terror.host.net.kg/definingterr.htm]. Accessed on February 26, 2003. 
4 Ibid., p. 6. 
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What is the meaning of terrorism in Southeast Asia?  When Association Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) members signed the 2001 Declaration on Joint Action to 
Counter Terrorism (DJACT) on 5 November 2001, they did not clear define terrorism.  
The declaration only describes “terrorism” as a direct challenge to the attainment of 
peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realization of ASEAN Vision 2020.5  
Terrorism as a profound threat to international peace and security, which requires 
concerted actions to protect and to defend all peoples and to maintain the peace and 
security of the world.6  The ASEAN summit only urged ASEAN members to “intensify 
our efforts, collectively and individually, to prevent, counter and suppress the activities of 
terrorist groups in the region.”7  
B. THE NATURE OF TERRORISM 
The nature of terrorism exhibits the following elements: 
• Terrorism is an international act  
• A premeditated act 
• An act of violence  
• It causes fear  
• It aims at a specific target audience or society  
• It intends to change behavior in that audience or society.  
Terrorism is a political act, the goal of which is to make a change.  The terrorist is 
not driven by personal desires or ambitions.8 
Terrorism is about impacting society.  There are three types of terrorist attacks (1) 
attacks that involve weapons of mass destruction, (2) weapons of mass casualties and (3) 
weapons of mass disruption.  These distinctions are made to focus on the intent of the 
terrorist act rather than the means.9 
A weapon of mass destruction is a weapon that causes damage to buildings, dams, 
bridges, computer systems or other structures of society.  A weapon of mass casualty is a 
                                                 
5 [www.aseansec.org/4960.htm]. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN summit, see [http//www.aseansec.org/13154.html]. 
8 Delaware Criminal Justice Council Terrorism Research Page, p. 2. 
9 Ibid. 
 7 
weapon that causes massive sickness death or both.  Biological and chemical weapons are 
weapons that are generally referred to as weapons of mass destruction.  Weapons of mass 
disruptions are weapons that cause social, political and/or economic damage to society.  
Magnetic pulse weapons (to disrupt computer operations), agricultural terrorism (disrupt 
food supply or manufacturing) or cyber terrorism (hacking into computers and destroying 
bank records or government records) are examples of weapons of mass disruption.  The 
distinctions explain how terrorist goals can be achieved, and they also illustrate that not 
every violent acts is necessarily terrorism.  A terrorist act can involve a weapon that 
achieves all three goals, as in September 11th.  The attack was one of mass destruction of 
infrastructure (the World Trade Center and the Pentagon), mass casualties (an estimated 
3,000 people died) and mass disruption (airports were shut down.  This resulted in new 
laws passed, heightened fear of future attack and the loss of millions of dollars due to the 
loss of the WTC as an economic center.10  
The nature of terrorism is the indiscriminate and indirect targeting of individuals 
with a specific goal and purpose.  Terrorism is indiscriminate, in that people killed are 
not targeted specifically and are of no account to the terrorist; however, the fact that 
people are killed is of consequence.  Terrorism is not an irrational act.  The targets are 
chosen because they will cause the desired impact (either the destruction of 
infrastructure, causing massive death, or disruption of society).  The nature of modern 
terrorism is that anyone can be a victim, but terrorism is not random, but causes public 
anxiety and fear and changes in behavior, which are exactly what the terrorist wants to 
accomplish.  Terrorism is also a public act.  The act must be such that the greater society 
will see it and react to the attack.  The terrorist may choose targets that have symbolic 
value or economic value (WTC for example) or targets that have public value (busses, 
restaurant, etc.) in order to gain public attention and to change public behavior.11   
Terrorism should not be confused with traditional warfare.  In war, the target is 
selected for its military value.  In war, groups of people are selected for attack because 
the people themselves have some specific value and attacking the group will achieve a 
specific military objective.  In terrorism, the group is of little account, but the fact that                                                  
10 Delaware Criminal justice Council Terrorism Research Page, pp. 2-3. 
11 Ibid. 
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they are killed is the point.  Terrorism should not be confused with war crimes.  An 
example of a war crime is an army advancing into some town with the objective of 
purging the town of enemy forces, and while doing so they kill unarmed civilians and 
noncombatants.  Although such action is illegal and a crime, it is not considered 
terrorism; people were killed because the destruction was designed to intimidate other 
towns or the society as a whole.  In distinguishing the difference between war and 
terrorism, the focus is on the reason for the attack and the impact of the attack, not the 
target of the attack itself. 
Therefore, terrorist should be understood as a political act to achieve a desired 
goal through the use of violence.  Terrorism is not an irrational act committed by the 
insane.  The terrorist does not act for personal gain or gratification, thus the terrorist is 
not a criminal in the traditional sense.  The terrorist believes in what he or she is doing.  
The objective is worth the life of the terrorist and the lives of the people taken.  The 
intent is not merely to kill those who die in an attack, but to affect the larger society as a 
whole.  An attack can be committed to destroy the building and operations of a society, to 
kill or injure people, or to disrupt the peaceful existence of the society.  The attack can 
seek to achieve all three or a combination of the three.  The objective can be to force the 
government to negotiate or to seek revenge for some government action.  Terrorism does 
not seek specific victims but it does seek out specific targets for a specific outcome. 
C. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
1. Introduction 
Terrorism in Southeast Asia is being pursued in an environment in which local 
factors supports the terrorist goals.  Increased efforts are needed to pursue law-
enforcement measures in regional states – a task which is likely especially difficult in the 
case of Indonesia.  Through the 1990’s, the international community faced a set of 
challenges, however, these more “traditional” and familiar types of ethic/nationalist-
separatist and ideological organizations were joined by a variety of “entities” with 
arguably less comprehensible nationalist or ideological motivations. 
However, further attention will also be needed to alleviate the social and 
economic disadvantage which has fuelled radical groups, especially in certain regions 
such as the Southern Philippines.  A Transnational terrorism threat can only be met with a 
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transnational response.  The internal security system of an affected nation no longer ends 
when the authority of this very nation starts.  Efforts to combat the transnational 
terrorism, the international security need international cooperation and broader 
dimension.  
2. The Characteristic of Terrorism 
By following an analytical/inductive approach, I will identify the trends of 
terrorist activities in the past and provide an outlook for the kind of terrorism that is likely 
to lie ahead.  In an attempt to predict future developments in the sphere of terrorism, the 
analysis of recent trends will focus on three aspects: The tactics and weapons used by the 
transnational /international terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah 
throughout the past decades, the targeted victims and the lethality of the terrorist acts.  
3. Terrorism in Southeast Asia with Respect to Jemaah Islamiah and Al-
Qaeda in Indonesia (Case Study)  
The salient features of contemporary transnational organized crime and terrorism 
will be introduced.  While avoiding a single devil’s theory of cause, this chapter will 
focus on the rise of transnational terrorism with regard to al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah 
and its increasingly national dimension within Indonesia.  Further, the analysis will focus 
on the national and regional economic aspects as main factors of the emergence of 
transnational Southeast Asian terrorism.  Any serious attempt to discuss this phenomenon 
must focus on the evolution of terrorism as well as on the aspects of the potential threat 
of arms technology.  
4. Terrorism in Southeast Asia with Respect to Local Separatist Act in 
the Philippines (Case Study)  
I will attempt to identify possible alliances between transnational terrorist groups 
of Al-Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiah related to local separatist groups Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Abu Sayyap 
Group (ASG).  This chapter will discuss the prominent elements of these different forms 
of collaboration between Al-Qaeda in South Asia and Al-Qaeda’s collaboration with 
Jamaah Islamiah groups related to the act of local separatist groups and their linkage to 
international terrorist organization.  
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5. Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Southeast Asia with Respect to the 
Philippines and Indonesia and U.S. Countering - Terrorism Policy in 
Southeast Asia 
The level of the threat posed by the terrorist groups in Southeast Asia is difficult 
to predict accurately.  Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, effort against 
terrorism have increased, but the result has been far from successful.  To curtail the 
spread of terrorism, the U.S. and Southeast Asia countries have created a partnership 
policy in combating terrorism.  The focus of this chapter explores the U.S. 
Counterterrorism Policy in Southeast Asia countries, particularly in Indonesia and the 
Philippines.  I also examine what the Philippine and Indonesian perspective in facing 
national and regional/transnational terrorists.  
By respecting the interests of each country in combating terrorism, the main value 
of the multilateral agreement lies in setting international standards and elevating a general 
awareness of international problems.  
6. Conclusion     
This final chapter presents summarizes the conclusions related to the previous 
chapters, answers the key questions of the thesis, summarizes counter- terrorist policy 
and its implication, and make recommendations for Southeast Asia’s future security.   
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM 
A. HISTORICAL ORIGIN AND CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM: AN 
OVERVIEW 
Terrorism, as a cost effective tool of low–intensity conflict that instills 
psychological intimidation through the use of illegal physical force, has ancient roots.  
Examples are the attacks mounted by the Jewish religious extremists known as Zealot 
Sicarii against the Romans in occupied Judea as well as the martyrdom missions of the 
Hashasin (assassins) targeting the crusaders in the Middle East.  The former were active 
for seventy years from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries.  Their experience has 
proven that terrorism can be effective, even if the tools are rather primitive.12 
In subsequent periods, several European maritime states between the sixteenth 
and late eighteen centuries employed pirates to terrorize the seas for the purpose of 
advancing foreign policy objectives.  The period between the two World Wars also 
witnessed waves of attacks in Asia and the Middle East where nationalist groups fought 
for liberation from colonial rule. 
It was not until the late 1960s that terrorism became a constant fixture of 
international life.  Rapid developments in modern technology, improvements in 
communications facilities, and inexpensive and rapid travel contributed to the 
proliferation of indigenous and international terrorist groups and to the intensification of 
ideological and political violence. 
More specifically according to Yonah Alexander, present day terrorists have 
introduced into contemporary life a new scale of violence, in terms of both threats and 
responses, that makes it clear that we have entered an “age of terrorism” with serious 
implications for national, regional, and global security.  Perhaps the most significant 
dangers that result from modern-day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, 
and rights of ordinary people; of the state system; the health of economic development; 
the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself.13 
                                                 
12 Yonah Alexander, “Combating Terrorism,” Strategy of Ten Countries, 2002, p. 5. 
13 Ibid. 
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The vulnerability of modern society and its infrastructure, coupled with the 
opportunities for the use of sophisticated high-leverage conventional and unconventional 
weaponry, requires each state, both unilaterally and in concert, to develop credible 
responses and capabilities in order to minimize future threats.    
Since most Southeast Asian states are developing, the domestic situation within 
those states enables terrorists to expand their power and network.  Owing to the 
grievances of their citizens, it is plausible that many Southeast Asian countries are 
becoming a haven for a small number of terrorists, which have been penetrated by Al-
Qaeda operatives for three primary reasons: the Afghan connection to middle Eastern 
extremists; the increasing grievance of Southeast Asian Muslims for socio-economic and 
political reasons; and Southeast Asian states have been considered “countries of 
convenience” by international terrorists.14   
B. TERRORISM AND ACTIVITIES   
With regard to predictions of future terrorism, the following analysis of recent 
trends will focus on three different aspects:  The tactics and weapons used throughout the 
past decades, the focus of targeting innocent victims and the massive fatalities that ensure 
from the terrorist acts.    
1. Trends in Tactics  
The terrorist has become lethal in the past decade.  Fortunately, the killings have 
thus far been conducted without the terrorists having to resort to unconventional 
weaponry.  In this instance, convention bombs create very traumatic effects, they are 
fairly easy to produce, and inexpensive.  The necessary technology and ingredients for 
each are readily available, and the purchase of ingredients does not arouse suspicion and 
is thus difficult to track.  In the same way meager skill is required to manufacture a crude 
bomb, plant it, and be miles away when its explodes.  Bombing, therefore, does not 
require the same organizational expertise, knowledge, back-up option, or logistical 
support required by more complicated or sophisticated operations as in assassination, 
kidnapping, hostage-taking or an attack against a defended target.15  Throughout the 
1990’s, the favorite terrorist tactics, accounting for roughly sixty percent of incidents 
                                                 
14 Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network”, 2002, p. 431.   
15 Hoffman, 1993, vol. 5, ch. 2, p. 13. 
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throughout the period were attacks, hijacking, hostage, kidnapping, and arson.16  
Barricade and hostage situations, accounted for the remaining forty-percent of terrorist 
incidents.  Time has shown that these percentages have remained relatively unchanged 
over three decades.  This indicates that the majority of terrorist organizations have not 
been tactically innovative.  Innovation has only occurred, if it all, in the methods to 
conceal and to detonate explosive devices, but not in actual tactics, and to date they have 
not included unconventional weapons.17    
2. Focus of Aiming 
The attention of the terrorist groups, in the past tended to be directed against 
objects rather than people.  Since a terrorist operation is symbolic in character it is 
directed against a symbol of the adversary, such as embassies, government agencies, 
diplomat business, airlines, and the military.18  The military, more than any other 
organization and agency, represents a state’s power, which it self is questioned and 
contested by the terrorist.  Unfortunately any alliance between terrorism and its resident 
country is likely to disproportionately increase the overall threat to the national security 
of that country, whether it is truly to blame or not. 
Presently, diplomatic personnel and an increasing number of civilian are the focus 
of terrorist attacks followed by business, airlines, and finally, civilian targets.19  Other 
incidents have included attacks on energy, maritime, transportation, communication, and 
various economic targets.  This trend toward a more discriminate target has increased 
greatly in the last six years.      
3. The Fatality Acts 
Most terrorist incidents result in fatalities.  Additionally, those operations that did 
succeed tended to kill many people.20  The reasons for this trend include: the media helps 
to act as a multiplier, increases the resurgence of ethnic and religious terrorism, meaning  
                                                 
16 United States Department of State, Patterns Global Terrorism, 1991-1996. 
17 Hoffman, 1993, vol. 5, ch. 2, p. 12.  
18 Hoffman, 1993, 5:2, p. 14. 
19 The United States Department of State, Pattern Global Terrorism, 1991-1996. 
20 Hoffman, 1993, 5:2, p. 14.  
 14 
that terrorists become more adept at killing.  Also, as societies have become more 
accustomed to violence and atrocity, terrorists must be increasingly violent to gain the 
desired attention and to create the desired effect.       
The inclination toward more casualties and fatalities, which began in the 1980s, 
however, is rooted in more than one factor.  Contemporary terrorist organizations are not 
only smarter than their predecessors; they also trend to be more ruthless and less 
idealistic.  For more of them, it seems: “violence becomes an end in itself a cathartic 
release, a self- satisfying blow struck against the hated ‘system’- rather than being 
regarded as the deliberate means to a specific political good embraced by a previous 
generation.”21  
In general, over the previous decades, the terrorist has become more lethal, yet 
has followed an established pattern of tactics and targeting with bombing remaining a 
favorite terrorist tactic with government, diplomatic and military installations and their 
personnel remaining their targets of choice.   
C. TERRORISM: CASES AND AIMS  
In order to develop further this discussion, the cases of influence and likely future 
targets of terrorist campaigns will be explored. 
1. Cases of Influence  
With the past as guide, future terrorist operations will be influenced by a great 
variety of different factors, which will influence each other in complex ways.  The 
influence of factors is based on the assumption that the various terrorist organizations 
with their different motivations are pursuing various aims. 
With respect to motivation, religious terrorist groups act in different ways from 
groups that are motivated by socio-revolutionary aims.  While the latter are affected by 
political, moral, or practical constraints, and thus purposefully adjust the means to the 
political end, a religious terrorist assumes a “transcended” dimension.  Religion becomes 
manipulated to provide a rationale for the use of violence, like the group of terrorist  
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 16. 
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called al-Qaeda led by Osama Bin Laden, using Islam to achieve the goal.  There is no 
need to justify the elimination of the infidel, when violence becomes a sacramental act or 
divine duty. 
If we look to the objective of the terrorist act, we have to distinguish between 
short-term, mid-term and long-term aims, and the respective means to reach them.  Is 
terror and atrocity, for instance, an end in itself, or is the terrorist act intended to achieve 
a long-term goal?  Is the attack part of an overall strategy or is it an isolated act?  Does 
the terrorist act itself serve an operational goal or strategic aim, or is it meant to finance 
the organization?22  
Besides motivation and objective, technology constitutes another important factor.  
The dimensions herein are availability, obtainability, and suitability of the desired 
technology with regard to the planned operation.  Terrorist organizations that are 
sponsored by foreign governments are likely to have access to the same spectrum of 
technology that is available to their respective governments.  Terrorists sponsored by 
other non-state organizations or acting on their own behalf are likely to be better funded 
and equipped than groups that act on their own.  For example, drug cartels normally have 
remarkable financial and organizational capacities at their disposal.  The Russian Mafia is 
believed to have access to nearly every technology, including nuclear material that the 
Russian government has. 
Another factor that cannot be neglected is the target itself.  One must distinguish 
between the target of violence, and the target of influence.  The “terrorist-victim-target-
audience” relationship is highly complex.  As Michel Stohl wrote:  
An important key to the understanding of terrorism is to recognize that 
while each of the component parts of the process is important, the 
emotional impact of the terrorist act and the social effect are more 
important than the action itself.  In other words, the targets of the terror are 
far more important for the process than are the victims of the immediate 
act.23    
                                                 
22 Maria Jose Moyano, Argentinos Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle 1996-1979, Yale University, 1995.  
23 Michael Stohl, “Demystifying the Mystery of International Terrorism,” in International Terrorism: 
Characteristics, Causes, and Controls, 1990, p. 83. 
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All three dimensions such as the victim, the target and the audience are 
furthermore to be considered in the context of the terrorist act, its objectives, and its 
respective motivation. 
2.  Future Aim Points 
Government and the military installations as well as diplomats are the most 
favored targets.  This trend is likely to continue, since those targets embody powerful 
symbols of the system whose legitimacy the terrorists are questioning.  In the case of 
diplomatic targets, the fact that two or more nations can be targeted at the same time (the 
host nation as well as the accredited nation) make this type of target most valuable. 
The military, more than other organizations and agencies, represents the 
monopoly of a state’s power, which itself is contested by the terrorist.  Since the nation 
state can be targeted either directly, being both victim and target of the terrorist operation 
at the same time, or indirectly, through actions that inflict either fear on mistrust in their 
respective society, it in general will likely suffer more lethally as indiscriminate violence 
increases.  Thus, the terrorist violence becomes the concern of whole societies and not 
merely of its sectors. 
As the volume of worldwide terrorism fluctuates from year to year, U.S. citizens 
remain favored targets of terrorists throughout the world.  As Hoffman noted, “Since 
1968, the Unites States has annually headed the list of countries whose people and 
property are the most frequently attacked by terrorists.”24  This phenomenon is 
attributable as much to the geographical scope and diversity of United States being an 
overseas commercial, political and military power, as it is to the United States being the 
only superpower and the leader of the free world.  While international terrorists may 
perceive a strike within the U.S. difficult, it is easy to attack a single American or an 
American interest overseas since these interests and citizens are so close, as seen in the 
Bali bombing where the prominent terrorist target was American. 
D. TERRORISTS’ MODUS OPERANDI 
Groups of terrorists have used a wide range of tactics in order to achieve their 
political, social, and economic objectives.  As discussed, these methods of operation 
included arson, bombings, kidnapping, hijacking, facility attacks, destruction of property,                                                  
24 Hoffman, 1993, 5:2, p. 24. 
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the slaughter of innocent people, and assassinations.  The terrorist arsenal not only 
includes explosives and arms, such as guns, but also includes more sophisticated 
weapons, such as antitank rockets and ground-to-air missiles. 
With the general pattern of criminal behavior, the modus operandi of terrorist 
groups will vary considerably depending on each group’s motivation and capabilities.  
Groups that are small and unsophisticated can be expected to rely mostly on bombings.  
Those with state support and whose members have greater skill will attempt to execute 
more complex operations such as kidnappings, assassinations, facility attacks, and 
hijacking. 
Having said this, what is of particular concern is the fact that “super weapons” are 
slowly emerging upon the terrorist scene.  That is, if technology develops new 
capabilities for terrorist groups, their modus operandi may change.  According to various 
intelligence reports, at least a dozen terrorist groups have shown an interest in acquiring 
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.  For instance, when the Japanese Aum 
Shinrikyo terrorist doomsday cult mounted the sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway in 
1995, which killed twelve people and injured more than five thousand, it was seeking 
more lethal weapons than sarin when its leaders were arrested.25 
Yet having attained considerable tactical success during the past four decades, 
terrorists sometimes find it politically expedient to restrain the level of political violence.  
It is important to understand that these self – imposed restraints will not persist 
indefinitely and that future incidents may continue to be costly in term of human lives 
and property.  Certain conditions, such as religious extremism or perceptions that their 
“cause” is lost, could provide terrorists with an incentive to escalate their attack 
dramatically. 
Indeed, future terrorist incidents could be much more costly in terms of human 
lives and property than in the past.  The use of weapons of mass destruction (biological, 
chemical, and nuclear) used as instruments of terrorist could inflict large-scale damage on 
persons and property.  For instance, while the probability of nuclear terrorism remains 
low in comparison to biological and chemical terrorism, the consequence for mass 
                                                 
25 Yonah Alexander, “Combating Terrorism,” Strategies of Ten Countries, 2002, p. 6. 
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destruction is enormous.  Thus, if a nuclear bomb is stolen, an explosion in a major city 
of one kiloton in magnitude would cause more than one-hundred thousands fatalities and 
damage totaling billions of dollars.  The human, physical, and psychological 
consequences of such an incident would be far more catastrophic than those of the Three 
Mile Islands or Chernobyl accidents caused by operators who innocently overrode key 
safety systems of nuclear reactors.26   
E. FUTURE THREATS   
Future threats include weapons of mass destruction that could be used by 
terrorists.  Some of the threats analyzed here are new in the sense that they will improve 
tactical innovation.  In a few cases, the innovation may be the change in terrorist 
behavior, or the emergence of hitherto non-existing or neglected terrorist types.  The new 
threats may not totally replace the traditional threats. 
1. Weapon of Mass Destruction   
During the Japanese rush hour, on March 20, 1995, the members of the Aum 
Shinri Kyo sect put deadly gas sarin in the commuter train bound for Kasumigaseki.  The 
gas spread through the car and station at which the train stopped, killing twelve people 
and over five thousand were injured and some permanently scared.27 
Since Tokyo was previously known as the world’s safest metropolis, the city was 
under siege with fear.  As Kaplan writes,  
The Tokyo attack marked a significant turning point in terrorist operation, 
and its aftermath sent tremors around the globe.  Mass transit systems 
throughout the world tightened security and in New York an airline jet 
spent ten hours on the runway at John F. Kennedy airport while the FBI 
checked out the threats that poison gas was aboard the flight.28   
The terrorist threat posed by WMD is a particularly difficult issue for the 
government because of the complexity of preparing for a huge variety of potential attacks 
and the many toxic substances that might be used.  Profound resources would be needed 
to prepare or solve such a problem.  Given the number of government entities and 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ron Puver, “Chemical and Biological Terrorism: New Threat to Public Safety?” Conflict Studies, no. 295, 
London, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1997. 
28 David E. Kapplan and Andrew Marshall, “The Cult at the End of the World,” 1996, p. 264.  
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jurisdictions that would be involved, many inherent difficulties exist in creating a 
coordinated program.  Therefore, the selective “risk management” approach in which 
limited resources are invested specifically where the risk is greatest is probably needed.  
There is also a need to control the official commentary concerning the threats of weapons 
of mass destruction in order to avoid creating needless anxiety.                 
2. Cyber Terrorist  
Scientists and experts are cooperating with the armed forces throughout the world 
to identify the vulnerabilities of a new battlefield using information warfare.  The basic 
assumption is that the one who controls this new battlefield retains the initiative on the 
other battlefield as well.  Modern societies of today are, to a great extent, dependent on 
the electronic storage, retrieval, analysis, and transmission of information.  The amount 
of data used in this process increases daily.  Their importance in the day-to-day life of 
these societies makes it a vital area in terms of security concerns.  Defense, banking, 
power supply, law enforcement agencies, intelligence, trade, and transportations systems 
area all on line.  This in turn exposes large amounts of vital, and often enough 
confidential data to mischief or sabotage by any able computer hacker.  
Michael Jakub, the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the U.S. Department of 
State, stressed this future threat.  Inevitable disruption of information systems through 
viruses or electronic sabotage, the ability of groups-especially Mafia-type and terrorist 
groups to obtain funds through electronic penetration and manipulation of financial 
systems, as well as penetration of info-systems in an attempt to obtain information on 
people and possible targets, opens up the dimension of information warfare to terrorists 
as well.29  However, criminal terrorists, organized crime, spies, and foreign governments 
are more likely to wage cyber-war against state or societies.  Regarding cyber-war, 
vandalism is more likely than destruction.  Nevertheless, the harm that can be achieved 
by means of information terrorism could be as destructive to the fabric of a society as the 
use of other, more lethal weapons.30  
 
                                                 
29 Congressional Research Service, 1995, p. 5. 
30 Walter Laquer, “Post Modern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 5, p. 35, 
1996. 
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3.  Religious Terrorist   
While “religion” is generally associated with “goodness,” religion and terrorism 
share a long history.  Historical examples of terrorism motivated by religious imperative 
are the “Zealots”, a millenarian Jewish sect that fought the Roman occupation of what is 
now the state of Israel between 66-73AD, or the “Thugs”, an Indian association of 
professional robbers and murderers who, being active from the seventh until the mid-19th 
century, systematically strangled wayward travelers as sacrificial offerings to Kali, the 
Hindu goddess of terror and destruction.31  
In recent decades, however, terrorism has been predominantly politically or 
ideologically motivated and thus overshadowed the relationship of terrorism and religion.  
While in 1968 none of the identifiable, active terrorist groups could be classified as 
religious; in 1993 at least 20 percent of the approximately 50 active terrorist groups could 
be described as having a religious motivation.32  
Although religious terrorism is predominantly connected with Islamic 
fundamentalism, it has to be recognized that a great variety of groups carry a religious 
element in their motivation, which is not necessarily of Islamic origin.  More recently, 
they are supplemented by new generation of millennialist groups, cults and sects, as seen 
in the September 11th and Bali bombing. 
F. COMPREHENSIVENESS 
In looking at the identifiable patterns in the choice of tactics and targets, bombs 
and guns were the favorite weapons of traditional terrorist groups, with an emphasis on 
bombing.  The reason being that bombing requires limited efforts and resources and 
provides a lethal output.  More recently, bombing seems to be used as a form of 
discriminate violence, becoming increasingly fatal and more disruptive.  It is a distant 
type of terrorism, with no need for terrorists to engage in any kind of personal interaction 
with their victims.  This may be seen as a kind of mirror image of our societies, which are 
daily becoming more anonymous. 
                                                 
31 Hoffman, 1993, p. 1. 
32 Ibid, p. 2. 
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Even though the total number of incidents as international terrorism has declined, 
the number of casualties has risen.  Terrorists have become more adapted to violence.  
When youths have grown up with violence as a normal and natural part of their lives, and 
are well trained, as in streets gang, in the science of killing, they pass a higher threshold 
for the number of casualties or the level of violence they are willing to inflict upon their 
targets. 
With respect to targeting, diplomatic, business area, entertainment places, 
government, and military targets are current favorite yet indiscriminate targeting is 
becoming more common.  Although the discrete targets are likely to remain the same, 
contemporary terrorism affects a broader dimension of the population than terrorism did 
in the past. 
The elements that have influenced terrorism are most complex in their structure 
and influence each other in multiple dimensions.  Thus, an exact prediction of future 
terrorist activities and the development of a successful preemptive strategy remains a 
most challenging task. 
Since politically motivated terrorism is in decline, and religious motivated 
terrorism, including the varieties of groups that respond to a religious imperative in their 
actions is on the rise, the self-imposed constrains of the past are harder to recognize.  
Thus, terrorism in the future is likely to be very different from the terrorism in the past.  
This effect is reinforced by the increasing number of cults, sects and groups that view the 
millennium in apocalyptic terms and feel themselves committed to hasten Armageddon.  
In this context, the September 11th attacks of WTC (World Trade Center) have clearly 
changed the face of terrorism.  The use of WMD by non-state groups or organizations can 
no longer be ruled out.  Terrorists, fanatical single-issue groups and even individuals can 
muster the expertise and resources that were once limited to only world and regional 
powers. 
The relatively recent appearance of the new type of terrorist such as the 
“Unabomber”, who follows no recognizable organizational pattern, makes targeting and 
preemptive measures for law enforcement agencies even more difficult. 
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In addition, the old–fashioned type of terrorist has adapted, grown, and learned.  
Technology has proven to be a double-edged sword.  New technologies that are coming 
on-line not only benefit government and business organizations, but terrorists and 
criminals as well.  Moreover, the information system used by advanced societies offer a 
new battlefield with new vulnerabilities to be exploited by terrorists.  Consequently, 
present day societies must face the traditional terrorist together with the new breed 
described above, as they must face old, traditional technologies together with the whole 
spectrum of WMD.  Thus, one could argue that terrorism has not changed; it has merely 
diversified.             
Future terrorism will increase for several reasons.  First, terrorism has proved to 
be very successful in attracting publicity, disrupting the activities of governments and 
businesses, and causing significant amounts of death and destruction.  Second, arms, 
explosives, financing, and secret communications are readily available.  Third, an 
international support network of groups and states exist that greatly facilities terrorist 
activities. 
Advances in science and technology are slowly turning all modern societies into 
potential victims of terrorism.  As such, there is no immunity for noncombatants or 
neutral nations who may or may not have any direct connection to those who choose 
terrorism to further their political or ideological agenda.  
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III. TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH RESPECT TO 
JEMAAH ISLAMIAH AND AL-QAEDA IN INDONESIA (CASE 
STUDY) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Southeast Asia is experiencing tremendous changes both politically and 
economically.  The market-oriented economies of Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have been showing robust growth since the 1960s.  
The transitional economies of Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are exhibiting signs of 
economic awakening and revival after years of internal political and social turmoil.  
Despite these encouraging signs, the region still has a long road ahead in its efforts to 
achieve developed nations status.33  This chapter focuses on development initiatives that 
have been incorporated in wider peace and conflict resolution efforts in an attempt to 
mitigate the local perception of past wrongdoings in communities that support terrorist 
groups.  
The root causes of terrorism, both domestic and international, are varied and 
complex.  Some factors are essentially ideological and include religious and ethno-
nationalistic extremism.  In addition, another set of factors arise from serious socio-
economic deficits, such as poverty and unemployment resulting from a combination of 
poor governance and the inability to cope with globalization processes.34  Southeast Asia 
countries have enacted social and economic development policies to inhibit a resurgence 
of terrorism within their jurisdiction.  The efforts of these countries demonstrate not only 
the potential benefits but also the shortcomings of using social and economic 
development as a counter-terrorism tool.  This incorporates an evaluation of the types of 
projects chosen and the correct implementation of the appropriate strategy.  However, 
further attention will also be needed to alleviate the social economic disadvantages, 
which have fuelled radical groups, especially in certain regions such as the Philippines 
and Indonesia.  
                                                 
33 Liam Chong Yah, Singapore, Southeast Asia the Long Road Ahead, Nanyang Technology University, 2003, p. 
1.  
34 Rommel C. Bonlai, The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia, 2003, p. 13. 
 24 
There has been significant analysis in academic and policy making communities 
as to exactly what constitutes “development” as well as “terrorism.”35  This analysis, 
therefore, begins with a short explanation of the interaction between the two.  For the 
purposes of the analysis, “development” is defined as a process whereby the real per 
capita income of the country increases over a period of time while simultaneously 
poverty is reduced and inequality in society is generally reduced or at least not 
increased.36  “Terrorism” is defined as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear 
through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.  Though some 
might surmise that poverty causes violence, the link between terrorism and development, 
as defined above, is by no means self-evident.  In fact, two of the countries included in 
this analysis (Indonesia and the Philippines) are generally considered developing 
countries with large numbers of marginalized people, in Mindanao, Aceh, West Papua, 
etc. and yet are still subject to terrorist attacks.  Part of this discrepancy is definitional.  
While “development” refers to the economic, social and political conditions of a 
particular state’s population in its entirety, the organizations considered in this analysis 
recruit and operate only from marginalization within their countries of origin.37  
Indonesia, the world’s fourth largest nation and biggest Muslim community, 
major oil and gas exporter, fulcrum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and the region’s most important state, remains in the throes of social, political, 
and economic instability.  These three forces from various circles of political instability 
render it difficult to emerge from the economic malaise that reinforces political and social 
tensions.38  It must be recognized that poverty and extreme socio-economic 
marginalization are root causes of terrorism.  These may be the result of either deficient 
domestic policies or powerful globalization processes.  Hence, developed countries 
should increase trade, investment and aid linkages with developing countries to enhance  
                                                 
35 For a brief discussion of the evaluation of these two terms, see Hoffman, 1998, pp. 13-44.  
36 Martinussen, 1997, p. 37. 
37 Martinussen, 1997.  
38 J. Rober Kerey, Report an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, p. 3. 
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their capacities for good governance, enabling the latter to eradicate corruption as well as 
to ameliorate mass resentment by generating jobs and raising living standards across the 
board.39 
Conflict can be interpreted as a form of bargaining, with its own discourse of 
accusation and wrongdoings, which is often distinct from the cause or reality of the 
original conflict.40  This general pattern is certainly true of the terrorist organizations and 
their support communities.  For example in Mindanao, advocates of the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) claim that the Christian-dominated central government of the 
Philippines has not only ignored the needs of the local Moro population, but also 
violently repressed Muslim dissent.41  
This chapter also focuses on the point at which government attempts to enact 
economic and social policies to address the perception of past wrongdoing in 
communities that support terrorist organizations.  Ruling administrations do this not 
necessarily out of any moral imperative, but in the interest of preventing resurgence in 
terrorist activities. 
B. INDONESIA IS NOT A RELIGION COUNTRY 
Indonesia is a unique country.  Before the introduction of the Buddhist religion, 
the Indonesian population adhered to the teaching of Animism and Dynamism.  When 
Buddha spread to Indonesia, most Indonesian people adopted this religion.  Then, when 
Hinduism came into Indonesia, most of the Indonesian population ascribed to this 
religion.  In addition, when Islam came into Indonesia, most of the Indonesian population 
embraced it as their religion.  Christianity arrived with the arrival of the Portuguese, 
English and Dutch.   
Those facts show that Indonesian people were quite receptive to new religions.  
At the inception of these religions in Indonesia, the role of the kings who governed at that 
time was very dominant.  In fact, the kings determined the success of the religion.  The 
king himself would accept the new religion and then invited his people to follow.  
                                                 
39 Rommel C. Bonlai, 2003, p. 14.  
40 Pillar, 1983, pp. 1-16. 
41 Marks, 1996, p. 83. 
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In such a way, the national role was pivotal in allowing the religion to spread and 
allow all of its adherents to practice their religious devotion.  However, Indonesia has 
never claimed itself as a religion nation, nor a nation of any one religion.  The kings also 
never proclaimed his religion as correct, although his people who were very devoted 
performed the same religious service.  Although there is a belief that Indonesia is a 
religious nation, it has shown little loyalty toward any one religion.  The movement in the 
name of Islam although currently considered fundamental, contains radicals (who are) 
and who practice fanatic law like the group named, Jemaah Islamiyah.  Unfortunately, the 
same Arabic term is used in Indonesia and is synonymous with all terrorist groups. 
Since the Asian economic crisis of 1997 to 1998 and the subsequent collapse of 
the Soeharto regime, the rise of an ethnic and religious conflict and the growth of the 
separatist movement and terrorism have signaled a loss of central authority over many 
provinces within Indonesia.  However, the authoritarian bureaucratic-military vision of 
the state and society dominating the Soeharto era has been replaced by a greater emphasis 
on civil society and political parties as the primary focus of order and stability, 
exemplified by parliament more powerfully and legitimately than at any time since 
1950.42  Furthermore, Indonesia weathered the storm over the impeachment of President 
Wahid and the ascendance of Megawati Soekarno Putri – the first female President.  This 
is especially significant as Megawati supports a hard line toward separatism.  It is this 
response to separatism that directly affects Indonesia’s future. 
Political analysis and intelligence officials believe that Indonesia may become one 
of the next key bases for Al-Qaeda.43  Indonesia is viewed as a prime operating region 
because of its numerous islands and porous borders.  Economic collapse, governmental 
corruption, growing sectarian violence, and the demands of the outlying islands for 
independence or greater autonomy are generating concerns that the Indonesian political 
system may not be able to withstand.44 
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The two largest separatist states are West Papua and Aceh.  Both share common 
grievances with the central government-economic exploitation, domination of provincial 
administration by outsiders (typically Javanese) with disregard for local culture 
(especially in Papua), and anger at military excesses and human rights abuses.  The 
separatist movement in Papua is largely Christian, making ties to al-Qaeda theoretically 
impossible.  This has resulted in widespread terror used by both the state and the 
Acehnese and Papuan fighters to subjugate the local population. 
More disturbing has been the large-scale ethnic and religious violence in the 
eastern islands of Indonesia (the Moluccas or “Maluku”).  From the outbreak of the 
violence in Ambon during 1999 until the middle of 2000, more than 9,000 people were 
killed throughout the Moluccas and more than 400,000 became refugees.45  Furthermore, 
the radical Muslim organizations in Java, such as Laskar Jihad (LJ), have used terror to 
mobilize supporters and to attack the government for insufficient solicitude for Islamic 
interest.   
In those matters, Indonesia is not alone in his battle against internal insurgence 
and terrorist.  Southeast Asian terrorist organizations with cells linking to Al-Qaeda were 
publicly uncovered in late 2001.  
C. ECONOMIC SITUATION AND GOVERNANCE 
Instability still lingers in Indonesia including separatist movements, religious and 
ethnic conflict.  The political and social uncertainties of Indonesia, a great power in the 
region, still pose a threat of disturbing the stability of its regions.  In referring back to 
economic recovery, the macro economy has not been strong enough to gain the people’s 
confidence and mistrust of their government is thus growing.  Under such circumstances, 
new administrations have emerged in Indonesia, and people’s expectations for effective 
economic management by these new administrations are mounting.  The new government 
has been facing major tasks such as promoting economic reform and settling social 
unrest.   
As a result of the Asia financial crisis in 1997, Indonesia which had enjoyed 
favorable economic development, suffered setbacks that exposed the structural distortions 
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hidden beneath economic growth.  With the financial assistance of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asia Development Bank, Indonesia 
showed signs of recovery in 1999.  However, progress continues to be slow.  The 
structural reforms are insufficient to sustain the recovery, so political and social 
uncertainties still linger.  The separatist movements, especially in Aceh and West Papua, 
are major factors that threaten the democratic process and stability in Indonesia.  The 
government’s efforts to downplay the possibility that Indonesia harbored international 
terrorists were blown apart by the bombing in Bali on October 2002.  This evidence can 
be distinguished from other violence in the archipelago by their planning, intended 
targets, and impact on the Indonesian government and international relations; it was also 
a blow to Indonesia’s fragile economy, which is continuing to make a very slow recovery 
from the crisis of 1997 to 1998.  Prior to the Bali bombing, the government hoped for 
growth at about 3.5 percent for 2002, rising to 5 percent in 2003.  However, these figures 
had to be revised downward.  The government plans to spend USD $630 million on an 
emergency stimulus plan during 2003 to offset some of the damage.46  Oil prices and low 
interest rates have helped the Indonesian economy, but corruption, political uncertainty, 
lack of confidence in the legal system, labor unrest, and the failure to sell nationalized 
banks have all been negative factors. 
Fortunately, Indonesia faces no conventional external threats.  However, in terms 
of forces that impact its internal balances, there are multiple threats.  One obvious force is 
international Islamist radicals such as al-Qaeda, who threaten Indonesia by supplying 
inspiration and training to disillusioned young Indonesians.  Other Indonesians perceive 
the West as a threat.  In the aftermath of the Bali bombing, conspiracy theories abounded.  
According to one widely circulated story, the bombings were an elaborate plot hatched by 
the Central Intelligent Agency (CIA) to bring Indonesia firmly into the anti-terrorist 
coalition and to strengthen the internal role of the military and police.47  The quick 
passage of anti-terrorist legislation, which could be abused by the security forces and 
efforts by the military to strengthen its local role, gave further weight to this theory.   
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Indonesian social reformers fear that renewed external support for Indonesian police and 
the military from Western countries, including the United States and Australia, threaten 
democratic reform efforts. 
As a sovereign state, Indonesians are concerned about the impact of the official’s 
past wrongdoing.  With the outbreak of communal and separatist violence, security 
problems in many remote areas and the lack of trained police, the goal of achieving 
reform of the territorial structure will not be achieved easily.  In fact, a new regional 
command has been created in Maluku and Aceh, which seems reasonable in order to 
bring the armed forces closer to the people.  Reformers are afraid that change in the 
territorial command system may either be deferred indefinitely or handled by the armed 
forces themselves rather than as part of a more comprehensive security and defense 
review by the civilian government.                       
The major problems that Indonesia faced were the unrest and the separatism in the 
country, combined with international terrorism.  This would seem to call for a stronger 
role than before for the armed forces, intelligence services, and the police.48  However, a 
wide spectrum of Indonesia, including Muslims, democratic and human rights activists, 
and business people, continue to distrust the security and law enforcement because of 
their past record.  They are much more inclined than foreign interests to see the military 
and police as a threat to their civil liberties rather than as a solution to law and order 
problems.  As the result, they remain skeptical of sudden and easy reforms.  
Despite Indonesia’s numerous problems, the Indonesian defense’s budget is 
estimated to be US $1 billion, only about 1 percent of the gross domestic product.  As 
much as three quarters of this amount goes into personnel cost.  It is estimated that the 
government provides only 25 percent to 30 percent of the budget of the Indonesian 
National Military (TNI-Tentara National Indonesia).  To minimize the lack of funding 
and to support military operations, the military continues to find other sources of revenue, 
particularly in business.  Raising funds becomes the central focus of the military to the 
detriment of the professional military activities.  The issue of raising funds also explains  
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the low value of the military to the territorial command system.  This is another long-term 
problem plaguing Indonesian’s security system, and one in which very little practical 
progress has been made thus far in the post-Suharto reform era.  
The main contribution that Indonesia can make to regional and global security 
comes from strengthening Indonesia as a well-governed state.  An Indonesia that is weak 
or riddled with corruption obviously becomes a haven for pirates, human and drug 
traffickers, and terrorists.  One positive development flowing from the Bali bombing has 
been much more active and serious cooperation between Indonesian intelligence and 
police services with their international counterparts, including Australia and the United 
States as well as Indonesia’s Southeast Asian neighbors.49  
D. BRIEF HISTORY OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST 
One network of militant Muslims has produced all the Indonesian nationals so far 
suspected of links to al-Qaeda.  It is important to understand how this network emerged, 
its historical antecedents, and the political dynamics over the last two decades that led 
some of its members from Indonesia to Malaysia to Afghanistan.  
The network has its hub in a religious boarding school (pesantren or pondok) near 
Solo, Central Java, known as Pondok Ngruki, after the Village where the school is 
located.  The “Ngruki network” began to coalesce in the late 1970s as Indonesian 
intelligence operatives embarked on an operation to expose potential political enemies of 
then President Soeharto from the Muslim right.  It drew additional members in the early 
1980s, many of whom had served time in prison for anti-government activities.  An inner 
core network, led by the two founders of Pondok Ngruki Abdullah Sungkar (now dead) 
and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir–and radicalized by repression at home, fled to Malaysia in 1985.  
Some associated with the Ngruki network returned to Indonesia after Suharto’s 
resignation in 1998; others stayed in Malaysia but continued to be in close contact with 
those who went back.50  Most members of the network share common characteristics: 
loyalty to Pondok Ngruki or its founders; commitment to carrying on the struggle of the 
Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s; desire to create an Islamic state under syariah law by 
first establishing an Islamic community or Jemaah Islamiah, and shared experience of 
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political detention in the 1980s.  Many are on the executive committee of an organization 
formed in Yoyakarta in 2000 called the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI- Indonesia 
Mujahidin Council).51  
The problem is that the Ngruki network is far wider than just the handful of 
people who have been accused of ties to al-Qaeda, but includes individuals with well-
established political legitimacy for having defied the Suharto government and who have 
gone to prison as a result.  Many Indonesians have expressed concern that pressure from 
the U.S. and the Southeast Asian government on Indonesian authorities to carry out 
preventive arrests of suspect without hard evidence could be seriously counterproductive.  
It could easily turn the targets of that pressure into heroes within the Muslim community, 
as happened with Abu Bakar Ba’syir, to the point that they become the beneficiaries of 
substantial political and financial support.  Combining a highly politicized national 
intelligence agency with law enforcement institutions and courts that are both weak and 
corrupt could lead to a recurrence of the arbitrary arrest and detentions that characterized 
the Soharto years.  
Indonesia is not a terrorist hotbed.  Proponents of radical Islam remain a small 
minority, and most of those are devout practitioners who would never dream of using 
violence.  However, even a tiny group of people can cause an immense amount of 
damage.  The challenge, both for the Indonesian government and international 
community, is to be alert to the possibility of individuals creating common causes with 
international criminals, who take steps that will undermine Indonesia’s fragile democratic 
institutions. 
E. THE EMERGING OF THE JEMAAH ISLAMIAH 
Historically, the term of Jamaah Islamiah came from a little known organization 
called Komando Jihad.  In the Islamic community it means “the group of people who 
desire to die as martyrs (mati sahid)” and who are committed to following the ideals of 
Darul Islam to establish the “Islamic state of Indonesia under shariah law.” 
With respect to the past decades of Darul Islam rebellions, in Aceh, South 
Sulawesi, and West Java, these were only three of numerous regional political 
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movements that occurred in the aftermath of Indonesian’s successful guerrilla war against 
the Dutch.  In each case, they were led by charismatic militia commanders from 
“modernist” Muslim backgrounds that controlled significant territory during the 
revolution and were reluctant to surrender the authority to the new central government.  
In each case, whatever the original cause of the rebellion, they each ended in demanding 
the establishment of Islamic state.  
Karto Suwiryo, who was the leader of Darul Islam in West Java, announced the 
establishment of the Islamic Army of Indonesia.  At that point, he regarded the Dutch 
government, not the newly declared Indonesian Republic, as the enemy and had not yet 
declared a separate state.  However, as he consolidated his authority in West Java and 
began to set up political and administrative structures, clashes with the Republican Army 
were inevitable.  On 7 August 1949, Karto Suwiryo officially proclaimed the Islamic 
State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia-NII) and proceeded to fight the Indonesian 
republic for the next thirteen years.  These rebellions were called Darul Islam, “abode of 
Islam,” hence the name of the movement.  Karto Suwiryo was finally arrested in 1962.52  
A little over a decade later after the Darul Islam groups were crushed by the 
Republican Army, the Darul Islam movement resurfaced in the 1970s.  President 
Soeharto did not become president in name until 1968, but Sukarno (the first President of 
Indonesia) effectively transferred power to him in 1966.  As elections were approaching 
in 1977, the one permitted Muslim party (Partai Persatuan Islam-PPP) was gathering 
strength as the loyal opposition.  A vote for the PPP was the only way ordinary 
Indonesians in tightly controlled states could express dissatisfaction with the government.  
To prevent the possibility of a large PPP vote, General Ali Murtopo (Minister of 
Information in Suharto’s cabinet) who was in charge of covert operations for Soeharto, 
reactivated Darul Islam, although some people close to the former Darul Islam leaders 
say that he merely moved to manipulate a movement that had already shown signs of 
revival.53 
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Through the Indonesian Intelligence Agency-“BAKIN,” former Darul Islam 
fighters, primarily but not exclusively from Java, who had been incorporated into the 
Indonesian Army and government, were persuaded to contact their old comrades.  The 
argument provided by BAKIN was that with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Indonesia 
was in danger of Communist infiltration across Indonesia and that only the reactivation of 
Darul Islam could protect Indonesia.  Whether through coercion or money or some 
combination of both, a number of DI leaders rose to take the bait, and by mid-1977, the 
government had arrested 185 people whom it accused of belonging to a hitherto unknown 
organization called Komando Jihad.  In realty, the Komando Jihad was Ali Moertopo’s 
creation.       
From the beginning, Komando Jihad and what government prosecutors called 
Jemaah Islamiah (Islamic Community) intersected, although it was never clear whether 
the government was attributing more structure to the latter than was the case.  Komando 
Jihad was the label applied by the government and Indonesian media to the former Darul 
Islam fighters, who never used it themselves.  The term “Jemaah Islamiah” appears in 
court documents from the 1980s referring to the new organization that Darul Islam 
thought they were setting up.  However, while the Darul Islam members certainly talked 
in terms of establishing Islamic communities in a generic sense, government prosecutors 
offered little hard evidence that Jemaah Islamiah was in fact an organization with an 
identifiable leadership.   
It was the premise of the Darul Islam movement, later adopted by Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar (now dead) and his followers, that setting up Jemaah 
Islamiah was a necessary precursor to the establishing an Islamic state.  
F. ESTABLISHING THE JEMAAH ISLAMIAH (JI) NETWORK 
Since 1993, Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar instructed his deputies, Hambali and 
Abu Jibril, to establish a network of militant cells throughout Southeast Asia.  They 
launched an active recruiting campaign in Malaysia and Singapore.  In Malaysia, 
recruitment focused on two key groups: Indonesian migrants and University Technology 
Malaysia lecturers and students.  In Singapore, recruitment focused on older, more 
established middle-class individuals: these were well-educated people with good jobs, 
products of state schools, not the stereotypical Islamic radical.  
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The membership of Jemaah Islamiah is highly selective and comprised three 
phases over many years.  “We want people who will be loyal to the aims of the group; we 
are not a mass organization,” said one senior Jemaah Islamiah official.54  The first phase 
involved the screening of individuals, including their family backgrounds and knowledge 
of Islam.  The second, Hambali enrolled the students at Pesantren (Islamic Board School) 
to study Islam.  Many young radicals were sent to Pakistan and Afghanistan.  The third 
phase, a training/recruitment regimen, was physical and military by nature.  Some of 
them were sent to Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and to MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front) bases in Mindanao.  There, they learned bomb-making, weapons training, 
surveillance, sabotage, communications and cell formation. 
At the heart of their recruitment was the Al Tarbiyah Luminal Hakiem Islamic 
boarding School outside the southern Malaysian city of Johor Baru that was purchased in 
the mid-1990.  The school master, Ali Guhfron, later became the head of the Jamaah 
Islamiah’s (JI) Malaysian cell, and in 2002, the head of operations for JI.  Students of this 
school included another Indonesian, Abdul Aziz, Imam Samudra, who went on to train in 
Afghanistan, and was the mastermind behind the Bali bombing. 
G. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF JAMAAH ISLAMIAH (JI) 
From 1994 to 1995, the Jamaah Islamiah (JI) was formally established, and in 
1996, Abdullah Sungkar and some of the Afghan veteran consolidated the structure of 
Jemaah Islamiah, and the apex of the JI structure sits the amir, its position held by 
Abdullah Sungkar.  Beneath the amir are four councils, a governing council (majelis 
qiyadah), a religious council (majelis syuro), a fatwa council, and disciplinary council 
(majelis hisbah), all appointed by the amir and subject to his control.  The governing 
council is headed by a central command (qiyadah markaziyah) that in turn exerts 
authority over the leader of the four mantiqis and the heads of wakalahs.55 
The central command organizes division into fours Brigade (mantiqi).  Mantiqi I 
covered the area of operation in Singapore and Malaysia and was seen as providing the 
economic wherewithal for JI operations; Hambali was its head until early 2002 and then 
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he was replaced by Mukhlas.  Mantiqi II led by Abu Fatih covered operations most of 
Indonesia and was considered the target of jihad efforts.  Mantiqi III led by Mustopa 
covered area of operation Mindanou, Sabah, and Sulawesi and was responsible for 
training.  Mantiqi IV, led by Abdul Rochim, covered an area of operation, including 
Papua and Australia, was responsible for fund raising.  According to one of the Singapore 
JI detainees, Hambali is the head over all of the mantiqis. 
The mantiqis and their sub-divisions have usually been described as a territorially 
based administrative structure.  Thus, the mantiqis were equivalent to regions, wakalah to 
district and so on, down to the fiah or cells. 
The ICG considered that the JI probably used the military structure, befitting a 
guerrilla army, with brigades (mantiqi); battalion (wakalah); companies (khatibah); 
platoon (qirdas); and squad (fiah).  The size of the central command is not known, but it 
includes the Zulkarnaen and Afghanistan veteran Mustaqim and included Mukhlash, 
Mustopa and Abu Rusdan before their arrests. 
Under Mantiqi I, there were active wakalah in Singapore, johor, selangor/Kuala 
Lumpur, and Negri sembilan by 1996.  In Indonesia, there were wakalahs in Jakarta, 
Medan, Pekanbaru, Lampung, Solo, Surabaya, Menado, Makasar, Poso, Palu, East 
Kalimantan, and Nusa Tenggara Barat.  Its subdivision had its own name, for example, a 
member of Wakalah Umar Al Chatab in Singapore.  It supervised two qirdas, jibril and 
Mika’il.  Under Qirdas Mika’il were three cells, named Hud, Ismail, and Daud. 
According to the description of the administrative structure of JI, anyone can be a 
member of JI who is Muslim, subscribes to salafy principles, practices a pure form of 
Islam devoid of corruption or innovation (bid’ah), and takes an oath administered by the 
amir or someone he so designates.56  The JI goes far beyond its formal members.  JI can 
work with any other JI-lamic community-as long as it shares the same principles and 
goals.  The groundwork was thus laid for establishing working relations with al-Qaeda on 
the one hand and the MILF and Abu Sayyaf on the other, as well as for providing training 
to like minded organizations in other parts of Indonesia. 
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JI Islamiah works closely with different factions of Darul Islam, whose leaders 
have a collegial relationship with JI counterparts and send their recruits to be trained by 
JI instructors though they operate outside JI control.  JI affiliated organizations have been 
active but decision making for jihad operations often takes place outside the JI command.   
H. JEMAAH ISLAMIAH CONNECTIONS TO AL-QAEDA 
As is now known, Al-Qaeda’s political objective is to set up Islamic states 
committed to the unequivocal observance of shariah law in Muslim lands from the 
Middle East to Southeast Asia.  It intends to do so by first deposing moderate Muslim 
governments, and this in turn requires eliminating the American support that helps 
sustain such regime.  It is against this wider political background that we must examine 
more carefully the so-called “new terrorism” and discern what is indeed “new” and what 
is not.  In this respect, it must be noted that the military strategic terms, Al-Qaeda is 
waging a guerilla war against the West and, and in particular, the United States.  This 
guerrilla war has transnational character and is not confined to any particular state 
because the constituency that Osama bin Laden seeks to win the support of is not a 
specific Muslim population but rather the 1.2 billion-strong Muslim ummah or nation, 
which transcends states and ethnic boundaries.  However, it must be emphasized that 
while this transnational guerilla war may be quite unlike a conventional, geographically 
delimited guerilla war conflict as theorized by Mao and Giap, it nevertheless remains in 
essence a guerilla war:  Like Vo nguyen Giap before him, Osama bin Laden knows that 
he cannot engage American forces directly as he does not have the military strength to do 
so.  Hence like Giap, he intends to defeat America by targeting not its military might but 
rather what he perceives to be its critical vulnerability or soft underbelly such as the 
American public.57  In order to gain support from the Muslim word, al-Qaeda expanded 
connections to relate operatives to influence the most populous Muslim countries in 
Southeast Asia, which have similar objectives, namely, to create a Muslim state under 
shariah law.  In this case, he connected and synchronized the operation to the 
fundamental Muslim group that was Jemaah Islamiah.  While many Indonesians still 
question whether JI exists as a formal organization, most appear to have accepted that the  
                                                 
57 “ASEAN Plan to Fight Terror,” The Strait Times (Singapore), May 18, 2002, p. A 14. 
 37 
men on trial for the Bali bombings were likely responsible for the crime and that 
Indonesia does indeed have some home-grown terrorists.  What is much more difficult 
for many to accept is that those terrorists have links to al-Qaeda.   
The arrest of Hambali the leader of Jemaah Islamiah could change this, but only if 
U.S. authorities quickly transfer him to Indonesian custody or at least give credible 
Indonesian authorities access to him. 
It is clear that the Indonesian’s fundamental connection with Osama bin Laden 
was established in the mid-1980s through Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and the Afghanistan 
training.  Hambali provided the most important ongoing contact with the al-Qaeda 
leadership but he was not the only person with direct connections.  Zulkarnaen, Syawal 
Yasin, and Fatur Rahman al Ghozali have similar ties.  The JI cells were fairly 
independent of each other and clearly had specific functions.  Each took advantage of 
certain socioeconomic, socio-politic, geographical, and demographic aspects of their host 
state to develop and plan operations.  Although some funding was raised locally, much 
came from abroad.  According to the Malaysian and Singapore intelligence, the JI has 
received some Rp 1.35 billion from Al-Qaeda since 1996.  That year the JI received 
Rp250 million, and Rp400 million in 1997 and Rp 700 million in 2000.58 
The way in which al-Qaeda systematically began to establish operations in 
Southeast Asia, beginning in the Philippines in 1991 through Osama bin Laden’s brother-
in law, Mohammed Khalifa, has been well-documented.59  By 1994, a Malaysian named 
Wali Khan Amin Shah was a key member of the cell established in Manila by Khalifa 
and Ramzi Youssef, the men responsible for the December 1993 bombing of the Word 
Trade Center in New York.  Shah and Hambali were partners in a Malaysian business, 
Konsojaya, established in June 1994 that provided funding for some al-Qaeda  
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operations.60  JI also consulted with al-Qaeda about a proposed plan to blow up U.S. 
installations and other foreign targets in Singapore in 2000, a plan that was discovered 
through videos and other documents found in Afghanistan after the Taliban fled. 
Despite these clear ties, JI’s relationship with Osama bin Laden’s organization 
may be less one of subservience, as is sometimes portrayed, than of mutual advantage 
and reciprocal assistance, combine with the respect successful student have for their 
former teachers.  One source familiar with JI described its relationship to al-Qaeda as 
similar to that of an NGO with funding agency.  The NGO exists as a completely 
independent organization, but submits proposal to the donor and obtains a grant when the 
proposal is accepted.  The donor only funds projects that are in line with its own 
programs.  In this case, al-Qaeda may help fund specific JI programs but it neither directs 
nor controls them.61  
I. AL-QAEDA LINKS: THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE 
Following the attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the Pentagon on 11 
September 2001, authorities in Singapore, Malaysia and the United states became 
convinced that a terror network link to al-Qaeda was operating in this region.  In 
December 2001, Singapore authorities arrested fifteen Muslim militants suspected of 
working with al-Qaeda.  Later, a videotape found in Afghanistan confirmed the 
Singapore connection.  Thirteen of the Singapore detainees were said to be members of a 
cell of an organization that authorities identified as Jamaah Islamiah.  Eight of the 
thirteen reportedly had training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.  They were believed to 
be planning to bomb a shuttle bus service carrying U.S. military personnel, as well as a 
U.S. naval vessel in Singapore.62  Singapore authorities said at the time that the arrested 
men reported to an Indonesian base in Malaysia known as “Hambali.” 
With the naming of Hambali, and with related arrests of alleged Jemaah Islamiah 
members in Malaysia, including several Indonesian nationals attention shifted to an 
Indonesia preacher Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.  In a speech in Singapore in May 2002, senior 
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Minister Lee Kwan Yew stated that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was the leader of the Indonesian 
Mujahidin Council in Indonesia, and also was the overall leader of the Jamaah Islamiyah 
organization, which covered both Malaysia and Singapore.  He was also found to be a 
member of Darul Islam, which aimed at the violent establishment of an Islamic state in 
Indonesia since the late 1940s.  He was in Malaysia for fourteen years to avoid detention 
by the Soeharto government and returned in 1999 after Soeharto fell from power.63  
Ba’asyir, the founder of a religious school in Ngruki, tried unsuccessfully to sue 
the Singapore government for defamation after similar statements from Minister Lee in 
February 2002.  He is teaching openly at his school and has gained many admirers both 
for defying attempts to connect him to al-Qaeda and questioning U.S. motives in the war 
against terrorism.  For the last two decades, he has been associated with small groups 
called Jemaah Islamiah whose teachings had both religious and political content.64  
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IV. TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH RESPECT TO 
LOCAL SEPARATIST GROUPS ACT IN THE PHILIPPINES (CASE 
STUDY) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Every year on the 12th of June, the Philippines always celebrate Independence 
Day from Spanish colonialism.  It was more than a century ago when the country 
declared itself a nation-state and an independent republic after 337 years under Spanish 
colonial rule.  Although it was the first country in Asia that gained its independence 
through a bloody revolution, the Philippines immediately had to accept American 
hegemony for another 46 years and Japanese rule for a brief three years.  The birth of the 
Philippine nation-state in 1898 and the granting of political independence by the 
Americans in 1946 are historical milestones in the country‘s history that reflect the 
Filipinos resolve to self-govern and determine their future as a country without foreign 
colonizers.  
The Philippines may begin to lose some of its characteristic of a vibrant 
democracy if the terrorist situation is allowed to worsen.  Internal divisiveness and 
conflicts among classes, ideologies, and ethnicities, could undermine the national 
solidarity that the Philippines have struggled to create over the past 30 years. 
Philippine history has been characterized by the dualisms of colonialism, 
revolution, counter-revolution, dictatorship and democracy.  The difficult but exciting 
process of making and unmaking of a liberal democratic nation-state remains a 
continuing one.  The country is shaped by its past, in defining its vision, national goals 
and objectives, policies, institution structure and processes.  Achieving national unity in 
diversity continues to be a daunting task in the post-colonial era.   
Facing the security environment, President Gloria Macapagal calls the central task 
for the Philippines one of building “a strong republic.”  The pillars of her political agenda 
include breaking terrorism, reducing criminality, addressing socioeconomic concerns, 
and consolidating, political institutions.  In 2003, the Philippines face unresolved 
questions arising from the Muslim secessionist movement in the south, the communist 
insurgency, and the implications of its vigorous support for global campaign on anti-
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terrorism.  Its domestic imperatives require the Philippines to give great importance to 
international cooperation on global terrorism and strengthen its working relationship with 
the United States. 
Problems related to law and order such as local insurgencies, separatism, 
criminality, and acts of terrorism continue to preoccupy the country.  Police figures 
showed that violent crimes increased by 25 percent in the first half of 2002, over the 
same period in the previous year, while robbery and theft were up 40 percent.65  In facing 
the local insurgencies the military and police continue to conduct operations against the 
New People’s Army (NPA), which is the armed wing of the communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP); the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) insurgency in Mindanao; 
and the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG) in the extreme south.  The Philippines government has 
intensified suppression efforts against the CPP/NPA as part of its strong agenda, but it 
still keeps open lines of communication for peace negotiations as part of a continued 
strategy by combining military and negotiating elements.  
B. SEPARATIST ACTS  
The religious and ethnic issues have increased significantly, the move away from 
traditional to modern systems creates a degree of instability, eroding the existing 
system’s socioeconomic and politico-psychological tenets and giving rise to counter-
elites and opposition groups, and paving the way for resurgence of racial and ethnic 
animosities.  Although unfamiliar with insurgencies, the Philippine Republic is facing a 
more complex challenge.66  Current separatist violence centers around the Moro Muslims 
on the Mindanao Island.  This phenomenon, however, is not new.  For the past 400 years, 
there has been a simmering struggle to defend the Muslim heartland from the Christian 
North.67  Moro separatist sentiment is underscored by four factors.  As mentioned, first is 
the resentment of Catholic migration from the north.  Second is the unwillingness to 
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subscribe to Manila’s secular civil, politic, judicial and penal constitutional system.  
Third is the frustration borne of Mindanao’s lack of economic and infrastructural 
development, and the fourth is fear of having religious, cultural, political traditions 
weakened or destroyed by forced assimilation into the Catholic-dominated Philippine 
Republic.68  The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) led by Abu Sayaf Group (ASG), 
which have both used multiple forms of terror, including murder and kidnapping to 
further their goals, currently wages this separatist struggle.  In the early 1990’s, the ASG 
bombed churches, shopping centers and transportation hubs.  In 1995, they were linked to 
a large al-Qaeda plot, Oplan Bojinka, to bomb U.S. airlines as they traveled from Asia to 
the United States, and in 2000, they initiated a spree of kidnappings involving foreign 
nationals, primarily with the aim of raising funds.69  In many ways, the threat posed to 
the central authorities by the MILF and ASG is greater than any previous separatist 
movement.  Both groups exhibit a radical fundamentalist Islamic identity that is largely 
unwilling to compromise on its basic beliefs and demands.  Furthermore, both groups 
appear to be linked to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network and have benefited from 
training and funding from that organization.  Finally, both are able to draw on a personnel 
resource base that is far from insignificant.70   
While the military action is largely confined to isolating the specific locations 
around the country, the terrorist groups have increasingly sought to destabilize the 
country at large through terrorist tactics directed against urban or symbolic targets.  In 
general, these groups do not act in concert with each other, and often they are not 
internally coordinated.  A particularly vicious series took place in October 2002, targeting 
shopping centers, buses, bus terminal, and shrines in the southern part of the country.  
The intelligence community believed that the October 2002 attacks were the work of the 
Southeast Asia-wide Jemaah Islamiah.  Earlier this year, two members of the JI were 
arrested and jailed for suspected involvement in bomb plots and illegal possession of 
explosives.  When the authorities captured the chief explosive expert Abdulmukim Edris 
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in a Manila suburb, they found that they had contact with JI and were planning attacks on 
the U.S. embassy and others targets in Manila.  The terrorist threats further underscored 
the annoyance of the government when Australia, Canada, and the European Union 
closed their embassies in late November for a time because of what they found to be 
specific, credible threats to their facilities and personnel. 
Increased terrorist activities continue to affect the performance of the Philippine 
economy.  Nevertheless, the economy remains resilient in the face of both terrorism and 
the economic weakness in major export markets of the United States and Japan.  The 
Philippine government has substantially strengthened its relations with the U.S. in the 
context of its anti-terrorism campaign.  In spite of the protests from the left, from January 
through July 2002, 650 U.S. personnel joined Philippine counterparts in Basilan and 
Zamboanga in the campaign against the ASG.71  In recognition of the increasing threat of 
terrorism, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia signed the agreement on information 
exchange and established communication procedures to fight terrorism and transnational 
crime in the region.  After the Bali bombing, the president asked that the joint monitoring 
committee be convened under the agreement.  The Philippines also has a defense 
agreement with five other ASEAN member states covering such items as exchanges of 
defense personnel, information and intelligence exchanges, and research and 
development of defense products.  The Philippines is also discussing a bilateral anti-
terrorism agreement with Australia that may include joint operational and training 
activities, and another agreement with Germany. 
The government affirmed its commitment to the global war against terrorism and 
its support for the UN Security Council Resolution on states aiding terrorism and the 
dismantling of weapons of mass destruction.  The Philippine National Security Council 
has approved extending political, security, and humanitarian assistance to the United 
States.  In view of the development gaps in the country, the Philippines is seeking to  
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revive interest in the Brunei-Indonesia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-
EAGA), a program to promote mutually beneficial cooperation in the adjacent area’s 
countries.72      
C. MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) LINK TO AL-
QAEDA 
The southern Philippines have suffered from civil unrest and violence for the past 
three decades, most of which has revolved around the separatist ambitions of the Moro 
Muslim population in the Mindanao.  Never fully colonized by either the Spanish or the 
United States, this traditionally staunch Islamic enclave has long stood apart from the 
overwhelmingly Catholic orientation of the Philippine state.  General alienation and 
discontent, however, have been exacerbated by several specific factors, including: 
• Economic neglect and general exploitation of local resources to foster 
development in the central and northern Islands of the Philippines. 
• The gradual dispossessions of ancestral lands by Christian settlers (whose 
transmigration has been explicitly sponsored by Manila to alter the 
demographic balance in Mindanao). 
• Repeated attempts to forcibly assimilate local Muslim communities into 
the wider Catholic Philippine polity (a policy that became particularly 
evident during the Marcos era).73   
Between 1971 and 1996, the MNLF acted as the main vehicle for armed 
extremism in the southern Philippines.  Led by Nur Misuari, the group dedicated itself to 
the liberation of all areas where Moro Muslims had traditionally existed as a majority 
population.74  Much of the organization’s support during this time derived from the 
severe social and economic circumstances of the Mindanao, compared with the rest of the 
Philippines and one in which it is generally accepted that Islamic communities have 
suffered the most.  Reflecting on the ramifications, this has led to conflicts in the region, 
Amina Rasul – Benardo, a senior at the United States Institute for peace concludes 
while all regions (in Mindanao) share in the problem, the burden of 
poverty lies greatest on Muslims… together, poverty and conflict have 
perpetuated a vicious cycle.  Poverty has fueled conflict by magnifying the  
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sense of marginalization and exclusion.  Conflict in turn, aggravated 
poverty through its effects on people, institution and the economy.  Thus, 
they created the very conditions for their own continuation.75  
Currently, Osama bin Laden expands his leverage to connect al-Qaeda with 
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), and since 1988, he instructed his brother-in-
law Muhammad Jammal Khalifa, to go to the Philippines to recruit fighters for the war in 
Afghanistan.  Bin Laden already saw the potential of the Philippines, and he was alarmed 
at the Moro National Liberation Front’s ongoing peace negotiations with the Philippine 
government.  In his eyes, the MNLF was abandoning the goal of establishing an Islamic 
state.  Khalifa traveled to Moro to recruit and facilitate the Jihadis’ travel to Pakistan, and 
in 1991, he established a permanent al-Qaeda network in the Philippines.76 
D. MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT LINK (MILF) TO JEMAAH 
ISLAMIAH 
Concerned by the deteriorating situation and conditions in Afghanistan, the amir, 
Abdulah Sungkar made a decision, probably in 1995, to go through the MILF to set up 
training facilities in Mindanao.  Regarding the budget condition and the need for 
operations immediately, he preferred to choose the Philippines as a site to use and enlarge 
the training facility.  The training area was chosen for many reasons.  It was cheaper and 
easier to send the members of JI to Afghanistan.  The minimum training budget’s grant 
came from Abu Sayyap Group and because those funds were temporally unavailable, the 
training operation would have to be funded out of JI’s own resources.  Beside that grant, 
Also Sungkar when collecting money to budget training facilities asked the Singapore 
and Malaysia wakalahs to contribute 20,000 Malaysian ringgit each, which was about 
U.S. 3,500.77  
The arrangement with the MILF was probably made possible by personnel ties.  
Sungkar was close to MILF leader Salamat Hasim.  The relation between MILF and JI 
was very clear.  JI member Fathur Rahman al-Gozali, one of the suspects who was 
arrested for the bombing in Davao Airport in Mindanao, was also a member of the Abu 
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Sayaf Group.  In the interrogation process, he told the interrogator that the MILF and JI 
had a standing agreement.  On the one hand, MILF would accommodate JI fighters in the 
farmer’s camps and in return, JI would help MILF guerrilla in conducting bombings in 
any targeted area until such time that Mindanao could attain its independence.78          
E. MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF) LINK TO AL-QAEDA   
Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda had entered the region beginning in the early 
1990’s, establishing independent cells and assisting and liaising with indigenous Islamic 
insurgencies that hitherto were believed to have solely domestic agendas.  There are four 
reasons al-Qaeda penetrated this region.  First, there have long been militant Muslim 
groups, who have been fighting for their own homeland like in the Southern Philippines; 
these groups were seen to have completely domestic agendas and little interest in linking 
with international organizations.  The second, radical Islam is growing for a variety of 
reasons.  These include: economic disparity, the lack of political freedom, the failure of 
secular education, and an increase number of students studying in the Middle East.  
Thirdly, the Southeast Asian states have been what might be termed “countries of 
convenience” for terrorists, with tourist-friendly policies and minimal visa requirements.  
As a result, they generally lack financial oversight, have well established informal 
remittance systems for overseas workers, porous borders, often weak central government 
control, endemic government corruption, and a vast supply of illicit arms.  Finally, 
Southeast Asia’s multi-ethnic, tolerant, and secular societies have actually attracted al-
Qaeda go into the region.79   
The growth of Islamic extremism around the world, since the Iranian Revolution 
in 1979, has less to do with theology and more to do with the failure of domestic political 
economic system of respective Muslim countries.  Increasing gaps between the rich and 
the poor, inequitable distributions of wealth, poverty, level of economic diversity, 
unemployment, corruption, and the lack of a viable political alternative have all provoked 
Islamic extremism.  People literally have become so desperate that they have nowhere to 
turn to except extremist religious politics.  Their economies slowed and become mired 
when the Asian economic crisis happened, which gave rise to a reformation and 
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democratic movement.  Islamic extremism was then able to take hold and enter the 
mainstream.  The lower economic performance weakened in support of security 
equipment and facilities. 
It may seem strange to think of Islamic-based terrorism as having ties with 
devoutly Catholic Philippines.  However, according to U.S. officials,  
the Philippines have become a major operations hub to al-Qaeda.  Some of 
the worst terrorist plots in recent memory were planned in the Philippines.  
In particularly, one plot was to shoot down eleven U.S. airlines in the 48 
hours of terror.  
Moreover, every major terrorist plot by al-Qaeda against the United States has had ties to 
the Philippines.80  
Currently, the MILF is the leading Muslim rebel movement fighting the 
Philippines government.  The Philippine government continues to enter negotiations with 
the movement.  Nonetheless, whereas the MILF have legitimate national liberation 
aspirations, it has forged linkages with international terrorist groups, namely al-Qaeda.  
The root of MILF contact with al-Qaeda dates back to the period of the soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, MILF sent an estimated 700 Filipino Muslims undergoing military training 
to join the Mujahiddin.81  Established in the Philippines, Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-
law, Jamal Mohammed Khalifa, began to provide covert assistance to the MILF 
financially and through training.  In Addition, he provided covert assistance by funding 
development projects zones under MILF control, or areas that constituted core 
constituencies of MILF support.  Al-Qaeda has placed a large number of instructors in 
MILF camps since the mid-1990’s, not just to assist the MILF, but also for other jihadis 
in the region, such as the Malaysian Kumpulan Mujahiddin, Jemaah Islamiah, and Laskar 
Jundullah.82 
The link between the MILF and al-Qaeda are very well established.  There is 
ample evidence that during the 1990’s the MILF received funding and training from al-
Qaeda operatives.  For the most part, this money comes through the al-Qaeda network 
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established by Jamal Mohammad Khalifa, in particular IIRO (Islamic International Relief 
Organization).  The linkages were both ideological and personnel.  The MILF, in Osama 
bin Laden’s eyes, was worthy of finding.  The relationship between the MILF and al-
Qaeda was significant, and the Philippine intelligence intercepted regular telephone calls 
between Abu Zubaydah, a senior al-Qaeda operations officer, now in U.S. custody and 
Salamat Hashim, Yusof Alongon (the head of the MILF Finance Committee) and Abdu 
Naser Nooh (the MILF’s liaison officer in Manila).83 
F. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S (ASG) LINK TO AL-QAEDA 
The small group but more violent than the MILF in the southern Philippines is the 
Abu Sayyaf Group.  Abu Sayaf Group was formed in the early 1990’s, and its early days, 
proclaimed religious fervor, it has become a criminal gang engaged in murder and 
kidnapping for ransom, striking not only in the Philippines but also in Malaysia.  The 
Abu Sayaf Group generally regarded by the Philippines government as a ragtag group of 
bandits with no broader aim than to enrich themselves.  The group’s focus is in the 
southern Philippines; it possesses neither the intention nor the capability to strike the 
United States.  Although it may have had some early contacts with al-Qaeda operatives in 
the mid 1990’s, at that time there is no evidence that these have continued, especially 
since Abu Sayaf now funds itself through kidnappings, which have exceeded $20 million.  
Abu Sayaf is more in the tradition of southern Philippine pirates.84          
The origin of the Abu Sayyaf can be traced to Afghanistan.  There were between 
300 and 600 Moro fundamentalists in Peshawar, Pakistan in the early 1980s.  One of 
them was the son of local Ulama, Ustadz Adularia Janjalani, who emerged as the leader.  
He had attended an Islamic university in Libya and Saudi Arabia before joining the 
Mujahidin and fighting the Soviets for several years.  The Philippine National Police 
(PNP) intelligence documents indicate that Khalifa financed Janjalani’s studies in Syria 
and Libya.85  In Peshawar, Janjalani befriended Osama bin Laden.  Janjalani was 
committed to waging a jihad back in his native Philippines to create a pure Islamic state 
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in the Moro Island based on Salafi Washabasin.  Following the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, Janjalani began making frequent trips between his home in Basilan and the 
Peshawar-Afghan border to recruit supporters.  When Osama bin Laden wanted to 
expand his al-Qaeda network, he turned to Janjalani to establish a cell in Southeast Asia. 
PNP intelligence documents suggest that it was Ramzi Yoesup who had 
encouraged the formation of the Abu Sayyaf Group to serve as his contact and support 
group in the Philippines.  At that time, Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World 
trade Center bombing, was teaching at the Khost camp in 1990.  Yousef and Janjalani 
struck up a close friendship in early 1991.86  Responding to an Osama bin Laden request, 
Yousef and Janjalani traveled to the Philippines where he trained Abu Sayaaf Group 
members in bomb-making in their camp in Basilan Island.   
The connection between the Abu Sayaaf Groups with al-Qaeda become clear 
when it was proved that in 1991, the ASG received some P12 million in grants from 
foreign sources, mainly from al-Qaeda, but also from Libya.87  On 29 January 1992, the 
ASG received some P 160,000 from Khalifa.  The ASG began to receive large deliveries 
of weapons from Victor Blout, a Tajik arms dealer who was later linked to both the 
Taliban regime and al-Qaeda.88  Through his sermons and notoriety following a series of 
kidnappings and massacres, other gangs of Moro brigands in the Sulu Island began to 
accept Janjalani as their chief.89  
The Abu Sayaaf Group grew in strength when it began receiving more al-Qaeda 
funding.  Most recently, in 2000 and 2001, the Abu Sayaf Group refocused its tactics 
operation to kidnap western targets and to rob tourist resorts for ransom, and 
occasionally, beheading victims during negotiations.  The families, corporations and 
foreign governments (including Libya) have negotiated within ASG to expand and 
improve its arsenal.  The money has attracted additional followers and communities have 
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somewhat improved relations to the victims that have suffered because of ASG rape.  The 
core of ASG membership generally runs about 200 fighters and numbers are drawn 
mostly from young, educated Muslim students who often have had opportunities (ASG 
provide funding for Muslim student).90      
G. COMPREHENSIVENESS 
Political terrorism is not new to Southeast Asia.  Today, the reasons for political 
violence in the region can be linked to ethnic unrest, religious disputes, political 
deprivation, and economic frustration.  However, it can be argued that most of post- 
colonial Southeast Asia’s problems date back to the time when arbitrary borders were 
drawn purely to satisfy the desires of Western colonizers.  As a result, the governments of 
Southeast Asia are faced with the tasks of trying to contain significant sectors of 
population that do not identify strongly either with their national rulers or territorial 
boundaries.  This phenomenon is evident for archipelago countries like in the Philippines. 
There are indications that the threat of terrorism is spreading in Southeast Asia 
despite being traditionally seen as a symptom indicative of the Middle East.  In the past, 
countries in Southeast Asia have dealt with threats of internal stability on their own or 
from assistance from former colonial rulers.  Terrorism has brought the threat of further 
instability to countries in Southeast Asia that no longer enjoy the benefits of rapid 
economic growth and long-standing political arrangements.  Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the Philippines.  If the “Asian economic flu” is an indication of how 
terrorism can spread throughout this region, Southeast Asia cannot afford to combat 
terrorism without aiding from one another countries in the region Southeast Asia or 
beyond its.  
The terrorist incidents occur more widely in democratic, free societies.  This is 
partly because of the opportunity to act and partly because of the potential advantage of 
publicity.  While terrorism does occur in the more controlled societies (and the very 
nature of such societies means that we may hear far less about their terrorism than might 
be justified by actual events), the control of citizens’ movements, work, political 
activities, and media, limits both opportunity and the potential payoff.  The greatest 
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potential for future terrorist threats lies predominantly in Indonesia and the Philippines as 
archipelago countries.  In Indonesia and the Philippines, the countries current financial 
crisis may spark a general outbreak of political violence as the public reacts to higher 
food prices, lower wages, job losses, and forced devaluation of savings.  
Through the support of Jamaah Islamiah, al-Qaeda has reportedly organized a 
very strong network terrorist group in Southeast Asia with two sorts of operations.  First, 
al-Qaeda sets up independent terrorist cells in the region, usually with a handful of 
members, some of whom are Arabs staying in Southeast Asia.  Second, al-Qaeda 
capitalizes on political dissent or poverty to take over organizations or companies and 
turn them into cogs within its terrorist network.91  Among countries in Southeast Asia 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are the major Southeast Asian countries with 
active local terrorist groups and with very strong al-Qaeda connections.  Indonesia serves 
as the largest of an Asian terrorist network; Malaysia has been identified as the perfect 
place for terrorist rest and recreation.  While the Philippines, on the other hand, has 
played an important role in one of the training areas for al-Qaeda terrorist fighters.  These 
regional networks of terrorist fighters have a goal of establishing a pan-Islamic state from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to parts of the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar.92   
Based on some cooperation among the ASEAN states exist.  Intelligence 
exchanges on terrorism take place, leading to surveillance of suspected groups, and local 
coast guards have increased their protective watch over freighters and accompanying 
U.S. warships through the Strait Malacca.93  Most of this cooperation has been bilateral; 
however, with agreements to strengthen intelligence sharing occurring when heads of 
states visit one another.  A positive result from these bilateral understandings occurred in 
January 2002 when Malaysia sent renegade Muslim leader of the Philippine MILF, Nur 
Misauri, back to Manila after he had led a short-lived insurrection in Mindanao.   
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Indonesia has also sent police specialists to the Philippines to assist in the investigation of 
suspected terrorist Fathur Rohman Al Gozali, an Indonesian with links to the militant 
Jemaah Islamiah.        
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V. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
WITH RESPECT TO THE PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA AND 
U.S. COUNTERING TERRORISM POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
We have seen their kind before.  They are the heirs of all the murderous 
ideologies of the 20th century.  By sacrificing human life to serve their 
radical visions-by abandoning every value except the will to power-they 
follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.  And they 
will follow that the path all the way, to where it ends: in history’s 
unmarked grave of discarded lies. 
President George W. Bush 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The level and character of the threat posed by terrorist groups in Southeast Asia is 
difficult to estimate precisely.  It is not fully clear, for example, whether al-Qaeda has 
tight linkages with regional networks (like Jamaah Islamiah) or whether the regionally 
based groups operate with more limited liaison or advice from al-Qaeda.  It is clear, 
however, that there has been some al-Qaeda involvement in of these, and that a major 
threat continues, as the Bali bombings have tragically illustrated. 
Since the attack in the United States on 11 September 2001, efforts have increased 
to coordinate regional and international actions again terrorism in Southeast Asia.  The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) announced increased cooperation at its 
annual ministerial meetings in July to August 2002.  During these meetings, the United 
States also signed an anti-terrorism agreement with ASEAN members on 30 July 2002.94 
Terrorism in Southeast Asia is being pursued in an environment in which locally-
derived factors have contributed to the basis of support for the groups involved.  
Increased efforts are needed to pursue law-enforcement measures in regional states- a 
task which is especially difficult in the case of Indonesia.95  However, further attention 
will also be needed to alleviate the social, political and economic disadvantage that has 
fuelled radical groups, especially in certain regions such as in Indonesia and the Southern 
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Philippines.  With these conditions, the world must respond and fight this evil that is 
intent on threatening and destroying our basic freedom and our way of life.  Freedom and 
fear are at war.  
We know well, as mentioned in the previous chapter the characteristic of the 
terrorist.  In this case, certainly, the enemy is not religion.  The enemy is terrorism-
premeditated and politically motivated violence that is perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.  Those who employ terrorism, 
regardless of their specific secular or religious objectives strive to subvert the rule of law 
and effect change through violence and fear.  These terrorist also share the misguided 
belief that killing, kidnapping, extorting, robbing, and wreaking havoc to terrorize people 
are legitimate forms of political action. 
The struggle against regional, international terrorism is different from any other 
war.  We will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might.  We must 
fight terrorist networks and all those who support their efforts to spread fear around the 
world, using every instrument of national, regional, international power, diplomatic, law 
enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military means available.  The 
terrorist organization in Southeast Asia is radical Islamic that communicates and operates 
across national boundaries.  Collaboration among the region’s governments is essential if 
the terrorist’s are going to be disrupted.  The United States, with its unique and powerful 
abilities can build partnerships with Southeast Asian countries, will lead the fight against 
transnational and international terrorist organizations of global reach, by striking 
constantly and ensuring that terrorists have no place to hide.  Working together, we will 
compress their scope and reduce the capability of these organizations by creating the 
partnerships that will facilitate regional solutions that further isolate the spread of 
terrorism.               
The Bali bombing on 12 October 2002 has directed attention to the issues that 
Southeast Asia is a region conducive to the activities of both domestic and international 
terrorist groups, and that elements of the two have been closely interlinked.  The  
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bombings have also emphasized that at a time when world attention is being directed 
toward the problem of Iraq, the “war on terror” pursued since September 11, 2001 is far 
from won.     
Southeast Asia had episodes of political violence which have either been 
explicitly or closely linked to terrorism.  These have included activities by communist 
groups (for example the Communist Political Party movement in the Philippines) and 
activities directed against ruling communist regimes (such as the bomb attack in Laos in 
2000 and 2001).  Terrorism has also at times been state-sponsored or condoned, as in the 
case of Christian anti-separatist groups in the southern Philippines (opposing Muslim 
secessionist) and militias in East Timor, Papua and other parts of Indonesia.  
With the strong presence of al-Qaeda’s network of terrorism in Southeast Asia, 
the U.S. has decided to return to the region and declared Southeast Asia as “the second 
front” in its global war on terrorism.  Destroying al-Qaeda’s terrorist network in 
Southeast Asia has become an important component of its global campaign against 
terrorism.  The main American blueprint in the global campaign against terrorism is the 
national strategy for combating terrorism as released by the White House in February 
2003.  In this document, the White House has recognized that terrorism has a very long 
history.  Additionally, it acknowledges that the September 11 terrorist attack was one of a 
kind using the advent of information communication technology to wreak havoc in the 
global community.96    
B. U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Providing support for counter terrorism in Southeast Asia is not easy.  It has been 
argued that the American failure in Vietnam was directly related to an inability and an 
unwillingness to understand insurgency as a unique part of political-military strategy.97  
Declaring a global war against terrorists without analyzing the local dynamics risks the 
same result.  The key toward successful counter-terrorist policy in Southeast Asia,  
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therefore, is identifying the groups that threaten U.S. interests as a whole, monitoring and 
determining their modus operandi, thus tailoring counter-terrorist efforts to eliminate the 
threat. 
Terrorism in Southeast Asia is not a new phenomenon.  Rather, it has long been a 
tactic of regional guerillas and insurgents who have attempted to change the political 
structure of their target state.  It also demonstrated that contemporary terrorist activity is 
associated more with communal or religious violence than with the anti-American “war” 
being waged internationally by “al-Qaeda and the regional terrorism namely Jemaah 
Islamiah.”  That is not to say, however, that U.S. interests in the region are immune from 
attack.  It has been suggested that terrorists attack U.S. targets because they perceive that 
the United States is a hegemonic super power that intervenes in the affairs of other 
nations or groups.  Moreover, there is a perception that “globalization” is 
“Americanization” and, therefore, destructive to local cultures, customs, and religions 
thus putting the United States into terrorist crosshairs. 
Counter-terrorism strategy is, in fact, a reiteration of an earlier document 
articulating the overall national security strategy of the United States.  In the American 
National Strategy released a year after the September 11 terrorist attack, the White House 
underscored that its priority is to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global 
reach, and attack their leadership; command, control, and communication; material 
support; and finances.98  In this strategy, the White House claims that it will disrupt and 
destroy terrorist organizations by: 
• Direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and 
international power. 
• Defending the United States, the American people, their interests at home 
and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it is at their 
borders. 
• Denying further sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists by 
convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign 
responsibilities.99 
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Southeast Asia is an important region in America’s war against global terrorism.  
Disrupting and destroying the vestiges of terrorism in Southeast Asia is the top American 
objective in the region.  In fact, when President George Bush assumed office, he already 
had the intention of strengthening U.S. involvement and engagement in Southeast 
Asia.100 
To intensify its countering terrorism in Southeast Asia, the U.S. is deepening and 
widening its bilateral security alliances and partnerships with countries in the region to 
“allow for the creation of a comprehensive security network in the Asia-Pacific 
region.”101  The strongest network, so far, is in the Philippines.  Other networks have 
been established in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, and Thailand.  
To enhance cooperation between the U.S. and Southeast Asia in combating 
terrorism, ASEAN and the U.S. State Department signed on 1 August 2002 the U.S.-
ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism in Brunei Darussalam.  
The agreement binds Southeast Asia and the United States “To prevent, disrupt and 
combat international terrorism.”102  Prior to the signing of the ASEAN-U.S. anti-
terrorism declaration, ASEAN had passed on 5 November 2001, the Joint Action to 
Counter Terrorism to “unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the horrifying 
terrorist attack against humanity and the assault on all of us.”  In this joint action, 
ASEAN members are also urged to undertake the following practical measures: 
• Review and strengthen our national mechanisms to combat terrorism. 
• Call for the early signing/ratification of our accession to all relevant anti-
terrorist conventions including the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of terrorism. 
• Deepen cooperation among our front-line law enforcement agencies in 
combating terrorism and sharing “best practices.” 
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• Study relevant international conventions of terrorism with the view toward 
integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms on combating international 
terrorism. 
• Enhance information and intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of 
information, in particular, on terrorists and terrorist organizations, their 
movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, 
poverty and the security of all modes of travel. 
• Strengthen existing cooperation and coordination between the AMMTC 
and other relevant ASEAN bodies in countering, preventing and 
suppressing all forms of terrorist acts.  Particular attention would be paid 
toward finding ways to combat terrorist organizations, support 
infrastructure and funding and bringing the perpetrators to justice. 
• Develop regional capacity building programs to enhance existing 
capabilities of ASEAN member countries to investigate, detect, monitor 
and report on terrorist acts. 
• Discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN’s 
role in and involvement with the international community including extra-
regional partners with existing frameworks such as the ASEAN +3, the 
ASEAN dialogue Partners and the ASEAN Regional Forum (AFR), to 
make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavor. 
• Strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in 
combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirm that at the 
international level the United Nations should play a major role in this 
regard.103 
The U.S. finds it imperative to be actively re-engaged in Southeast Asian security 
affairs because its motive goes beyond anti-terrorism.  The U.S. has greater strategic 
intentions concerning the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia.  These strategy intentions 
are to contain China, to promote American economic interests in Southeast Asia, and to 
control sea lanes of communication in the South China Sea.104  
C. THE PHILIPPINES PERSPECTIVE IN FACING THE TERRORIST ACT 
The Philippines were the first ASEAN state to declare the strongest support to the 
United States’ counter to terrorism.  Manila even expressed willingness to deploy 
Philippine troops to Afghanistan once approved by the Philippine Congress.  The 
Philippines also offered its territory to the United States as transit points or staging areas 
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of troops fighting the war on terrorism in Afghanistan.  When President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo visited the United States in November 2002, she reiterated her 
administration’s full support for the United States’ counter-terrorism efforts. 
Prior to the visit, the Philippine government formed the International Agency 
Task Force against International Terrorism on 24 September 2001.  This International 
Agency aims to coordinate intelligence operations and to facilitate the identification and 
neutralization of suspected terrorist cells in the Philippines.  To freeze the financial assets 
of international terrorists, the Philippine Congress passed the Anti- Money Laundering 
Act of 29 September 2001.  President Arroyo also announced on 12 October 2001 her 
fourteen pillar approach to combat terrorism as stated below. 
• Designate a Cabinet Oversight Committee on international security as the 
nation’s anti-terrorism body. 
• Seek to consolidate intelligence projects. 
• Call on the armed Forces and the Philippine National police to address 
terrorists. 
• Hold accountable all public and private organizations abetting terrorism, 
• Seek regional consensus and cooperation especially with Indonesia and 
Malaysia in the war against terrorism. 
• Anticipate legal issues and concerns. 
• Pursue Christian-Muslim dialogue and seek to promote ecumenism. 
• Call for greater vigilance and concrete measures against all possible 
terrorist supplies, materials and finances. 
• Mobilize disaster coordination efforts in the event of catastrophic attack; 
• Secure critical infrastructure. 
• Protect overseas workers and seek their immediate transfer if needed. 
• Seek the integration of the global terrorist threat in the AFN/PNP 
modernization program. 
• Ask for media responsibility. 
• Seek to address the socio-economic and political roots of perceived 
fanaticism and irrational violence.105  
                                                 
105 Rommel C. Banlaoi, The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia, Strategic and Integrative Studies Center, Inc. 
Quezon City, 2003, p. 47.  
 62 
On the basis of the fourteen pillars to combat terrorism, the Philippine 
government also issued General Order Nr. 2 on May 2002 directing the Armed Forces of 
the Philippine National Police to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless 
violence in Mindanao.  Together with General Order Nr. 2, the Philippine government 
also issued on the same day the Memorandum Order Nr. 61 to provide support for 
quelling the acts of terrorism in the Southern Philippines. 
D. INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE IN FACING THE TERRORIST ACT 
Indonesia condemned the September 11th attacks and expressed its readiness to 
cooperate with any United Nations collective action against terrorism.  President 
Megawati was the first Muslim leader in Asia who visited the White House.  On 19 
September 2001, President Megawati met President Bush and exchanged pledges to 
strengthen existing cooperation in the global effort to combat international terrorism.  
Bush also promised to lift the embargo on commercial sales of non – lethal military items 
to Indonesia.106  Moreover, on 5 October 2001 the Indonesian government issued a four – 
point statements on terrorist, which stated that: 1) Indonesia is committed and ready to 
cooperate with the international community in fighting terrorism; 2) Indonesia’s support 
initiative would work through the United Nations; 3) All action in retaliation should be 
proportional; and 4) All parties should avoid open war.  
Indonesian support for the United States’ led campaign against terrorism has 
improved the U.S.-Indonesia military relations.  Since the early 1990’s, Indonesian-
America military ties have been on hold in reaction to the 1992 Santa Cruz massacre in 
Dili and the perceived human rights violations in East Timor.  Driven by the United 
States’ war on terrorism in Southeast Asia, the American and Indonesian governments 
have found the opportunity to rebuild their ties.107  
The United States Department of Defense has openly pursued the restoration of a 
full military-to-military relationship with Indonesia.108  Notwithstanding the United  
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States congressional ban on military-to-military ties with Indonesia, the United States 
Congress passed a bill in December 2001 allowing the Indonesia military to participate in 
the United States initiated counter-terrorism training and programs. 
Despite these positive developments in United States-Indonesia relations, Jakarta 
remains critical of the United States’ global war against terrorism. 
Indonesia demanded the United States not target a specific country in its war on 
terrorism arguing that it would affect U.S. investments in that country.109  When the U.S. 
asked that all “civilized states to block financial support for terrorist movements,” 
Indonesia also displayed a lukewarm reaction because of thousands of Islamic charities in 
Southeast Asia.110  To scrutinize those charities in its own country would risk a 
significant Muslim backlash, not to mention coming from overseas and non-government 
organizations.111  
Nonetheless, Indonesia regarded the U.S. war on terrorism as an opportunity to 
resume U.S. - Indonesian military relations, especially in light of separatist and sectarian 
violence in Aceh, the Malucas, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya.  Jakarta knows that the United 
States can be of great assistance in combating its own terrorism problems. 
One of the strategic interests of Indonesia from the United States, in the 
countering of terrorism, was acquiring military assistance and training.  The United States 
Department has requested that Congress appropriate $16 million to assist Indonesia in 
training its police in counter-terrorism and its military in domestic peacekeeping 
operations.  The United States State Department has also requested an additional 
$400,000 for training civilians in security studies under the International Military and 
Education Training (IMET) and $17.9 million for combating terrorism in Southeast 
Asia.112    
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The Bali bombings have unleashed a tremendous negative impact on Indonesia’s 
response to the global campaign against terrorism.  The bombing created an internal and 
international problem for Indonesia. 
Internally, the bombing resulted in the decline of popularity of President 
Megawati.  Before the bombing, Megawati’s popularity was so high that it almost 
assured her of re-election in 2004.  Her popularity eroded after the bombings.  Although 
she went immediately to Bali in the aftermath of the bombings and held various cabinet 
meetings in those days, Indonesians still “saw no effort on her part to direct policy or to 
bring her unruly cabinet into line to convey the image of a united government with a 
sense of purpose”.113  
Economically, the Bali bombings left deep economic and social scars on 
Indonesia.  Before, Bali was a tourist center in Indonesia; now it has become a ghost 
town.114  Demands for local hotels have dropped to 27 percent after the bombing and 
most major foreign tourist agencies have put travel to Bali on hold.115  While 
international business has promised to stay, “the departure of non-essential diplomats and 
dependents from some embassies, together with travel warnings from many more, are 
clearly going to hurt.”116  
Internationally, many states expressed sympathy with Indonesia but the bombings 
have also caused enormous worries, especially among affected countries like Australia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines. 
Because of the adverse impact the Bali bombing have caused to Indonesia, 
Megawati’s government adopted two anti-terrorism regulations.  One anti-terrorism 
regulation is called “government regulation in lieu of law” as part of Nr. 1/2002 on the 
eradication of terrorist act.  It contains 47 articles; the crucial points of this regulation are: 
• The new regulation defines terrorism as any violent act that could create 
terror or insecurity among the public, violate the public’s freedom, cause 
the death of other people or cause the destruction of vital strategic objects. 
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• These crimes are then broken down into detailed acts, ranging from petty 
acts such as the issuing of bogus threats such as using a nuclear weapon to 
create terror. 
• A corporation involved in terrorist acts can be finding up to Rp 1 trillion 
and have its rational license revoked. 
• Unlike the criminal code, the anti-terrorism regulation allows intelligence 
reports to be used as legal evidence. 
• Based on prima facie evidence, suspected terrorists can be arrested for 
seven days and detained for a period of six months for questioning and 
prosecution. 
• Investigators also have the authority to go through personal mail and 
parcels, and to tap telephone conversations or other forms of 
communication, with the actual tapping being permissible for a period of 
up to one year. 
• Investigators, prosecutors and judges are given the power under this 
regulation to block any bank accounts belonging to suspected terrorists or 
to those allegedly funding terrorist activities. 
• The state also has the obligation to pay compensation and restitution to the 
victims of terrorist acts.      
• The Government Regulation in lieu of law Nr. 2/2002 allows retroactively 
bringing the perpetrators of the Bali bombing attack to justice.117  
This government regulation combines categories and investigations of acts of 
terrorism, and its concomitant punishments.  As mentioned above, another anti-terrorism 
law is called regulation Nr. 2/2002 on the Enactment of government Regulation In-Lieu 
of Law Nr. 1/2002.  The government regulation in lieu of Law Nr. 2/2002 is considered 
an umbrella to all other regulations dealing with the elimination of crimes of terrorism.  
Regulation 2/2002 also contains two articles relating to the investigation on the 
horrendous Bali bombing.  At the same time, Presidential Instruction Nr. 4 / 2002 gives 
authority to the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs to coordinate 
steps to fight terrorism and Presidential Instruction Nr. 5 of 2002 gives authority to the 
National Intelligence Agency to coordinate intelligence activities.118  
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All these measures are in agreement with Indonesia’s commitment to combating 
terrorism as a threat to national and international peace and security and are regarded as 
serious strategic steps of Indonesia.   
E. COUNTER –TERRORISM 
With regard to the reality that Southeast Asia radical Islamic terrorist 
organizations or cells communicate and operate across boundaries, collaboration among 
the region’s governments is essential if they are going to be disrupted.  The office of 
counter-terrorism within the Department of State coordinates all United States 
government efforts to improve counter-terrorism cooperation with foreign governments.  
Modern terrorists are inherently international.  Therefore, many countries perceive that 
they have a shared interest in enhancing international cooperation in order to suppress 
those forms of terrorism that they believe to be a threat to their national security.119  The 
main value of a multilateral agreement lies in setting international standards and 
symbolizing general awareness of international problems.120  In light of this assertion, 
diplomacy must lead the United States’ efforts to combat terrorism in Southeast Asia.  
Multilateral diplomatic efforts such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations 
(ASEAN) or the ASEAN Regional Forum (AFR) assist in forging substantive agreements 
that will enhance the sharing of information, tighten border agreements, and reinforce law 
enforcement cooperation.  For example, the United States-ASEAN joint declaration on 
counter-terrorism, among other goals, pledges to share intelligence, block terrorist funds, 
tighten borders, and crack down on forged travel documents. 
Responding to domestic concerns over United States involvement in Afghanistan, 
the new pre-emptive war doctrine and the fear of further United States military activity in 
Muslim countries, some ASEAN nations and Indonesia in particular, rejected United 
States pressure to drop ASEAN’s fundamental concept of non-interference in the  
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domestic affairs of others.121  A compromise was therefore reached whereby the 
signatories recognize and incorporated into a declaration “the principal of sovereign 
equality, territorial integrity, and non intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.” 
Nevertheless, multilateral diplomacy, as demonstrated in the ASEAN-U.S. joint 
declaration, can provide a formal structure for making demands and implementing 
response without the taint of being solely the work of the United States.122  These 
structures can include conventions or resolutions that bind signatories to the stated goal, 
and these resolutions can be useful in that they reinforce an international norm against the 
use of terrorism, and thirdly, they provide a common standard that facilitates cooperation 
on various matters.123 
One must be wary, however, of ASEAN’s multilateral past.  Because of the 
adherence to non-interference in the internal affairs of other states a serious problem 
inherent in the so-called “ASEAN way” – cautions that diplomacy is the norm.  Conflict 
is dealt with internally by postponing difficult issues or compartmentalization of 
cooperation.  The result is that few contentious issues are solved.124  Instead, they are left 
to fester.  Thus, multilateralism for ASEAN has also meant inaction and paralysis in 
many areas. 
There is, however, much to be encouraged about.  Although after the terror attack 
against the United States, Prime Minister Mahatir initially opposed any resolution 
backing U.S. military action, arguing that ASEAN should only endorse a U.N. General 
Assembly resolution condemning terrorism.  ASEAN rejected Mahatir’s attempt to go on 
record against U.S. action and instead issued a statement condemning terrorism and the 
attack on the United States as “an attack against humanity and an assault on all of us.”125  
Another function of diplomacy is its support of U.S. criminal law, particularly in 
the prosecution of terrorist whose acts are committed against American interests 
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overseas.  The Omnibus Terrorist Act of 1986 made terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens 
abroad a federal crime and authorized extraterritorial arrest and trial in U.S. courts.126  
This is a particularly difficult task in light of two issues.  The first is the abhorrence by 
many nations of the death penalty and its application in the Anti-terrorist and Effective 
Death Penalty Act 1996 (AEDPA), where it is prescribed for various terrorist crimes 
against Americans.  Second, and more importantly from a foreign policy perspective, is 
the fact that in implementing extraterritoriality, the U.S. is asking other governments to 
yield in ways that the United States itself would be unlikely to yield.127  
Extraterritoriality in the prosecution of terrorists, therefore, is heavily dependent 
upon the cooperation of other states, thus placing the burden on diplomatic efforts on the 
United Nations and other regions to permit U.S. counter-terrorist policy.  That is, it 
requires the application of international coercion through economic sanctions against 
state sponsors.  Although the United States can and has instituted unilateral sanctions, it 
is clear that only multilateral sanctions can achieve the full effect of the sanctions’ intent.  
Moreover it has been asserted that unilateral sanctions may in fact cause the sanctioned 
state and its population to become more recalcitrant.128  
Terrorism is a direct challenge to the economic growth for developing countries in 
Southeast Asia.  Countering the terrorist threat remains a high priority.  The Department 
of State of the United States of America has developed a three-part, counter- terrorist 
policy that is claimed to have worked well over the years such as: 
• Make no concessions to terrorists. 
• Bring terrorists to justice for the crime. 
• Isolate and apply pressure on the state that sponsors and supports them to 
change its behavior.129    
Other strategies to counter terrorists also exist, and are included in the U.S. 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003.  They are:  
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• Destroy the terrorists and their organization. 
• End the state sponsorship of terrorism. 
• Establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with 
regard to combating terrorism. 
• Interdict and disrupt material support for terrorism. 
• Partner with the international community to strengthen weak states and 
prevent the emergence of terrorism. 
• Enhance measures to ensure the integrity, reliability, and availability of 
critical and information-based infrastructures at home and abroad.130 
With regard to the economic aspect in countering terrorism, the Leaders of APEC 
(APEC leaders’ statement on fighting terrorism, Los Cabos Mexico, 26 October 2002) 
are determined to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation in line with specific 
circumstances in their respective economies, through: 
• Appropriate financial measures to prevent the flow of funds to terrorists, 
including accelerating work on combating financial crimes. 
• Adherence by all economies of all relevant international requirements for 
the security of air and maritime transportation, and transport ministers to 
enhance airport, aircraft, and port security, achieve effective outcomes as 
early as possible, and assure full implementation in this regard. 
• Strengthen energy security in the region through the mechanism of the 
Energy Security Initiative, which examines measures to respond to 
temporary supply disruption and longer term challenges facing the 
region’s energy supply. 
• Increase the activities in the area of critical sector protection, including 
telecommunications, transportations, health and energy. 
• Enhance custom communication networks as, and expeditious 
development of, a global integrated electronic custom network, which 
would allow customs authorities to better enforce laws while minimizing 
the impact on the flow of trade. 
• Cooperate to develop an electronic movement records system that will 
enhance border security while ensuring that legitimate travelers are not 
inconvenienced. 
• Strengthen economic building and technical cooperation to enable member 
economies to put into place and enforce effective counter-terrorism 
measures.  
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• Cooperate to limit economic fallout from the attacks and move to restore 
economic confidence in the region through policies and measures that 
increase economic growth as well as provide a stable environment for 
trade, investment, travel and tourism.131 
The primary tenet of the United States and Southeast Asia counter-terrorism 
policy is to make no concession to terrorists; conversely, al-Qaeda’s raison d’être is to 
destroy the United States.  Therefore, the only viable response is to destroy al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates like Jemaah Islamiah by using all counter-terrorist means, including military 
force. 
However, the United States must carefully weigh the likely strategic, political and 
economic consequences of any offensive action taken overseas against international 
terrorists and their bases, their personnel and where relevant, their state sponsors. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Since the early 1990’s, terrorism has undergone profound changes.  New 
adversaries, with new motivations and new rationales surfaced to challenge much of the 
conventional wisdom covering both terrorists and terrorism.  Critically, many analysts 
both internal and external to government were slow to recognize these changes, or even 
worse, dismissed them.  Accordingly, throughout most of the 1990’s our conceptions and 
policies remained largely the same, dating from terrorism’s emergence as a global 
security problem more than thirty years before.  These conceptions originated and took 
hold during the Cold War when radical left-wing terrorist groups then active through the 
world were widely regarded as posing the most serious threat to western security.132  The 
situation during the 1990’s strengthened our notions of the “stereotypical-type terrorist 
organization.” 
The groups of terrorists, for example, were once recognizable mostly as a 
collection of individuals belonging to a specific organization with well-defined command 
and control apparatuses, who were engaged in conspiracy as a full-time avocation, living 
underground while constantly planning and plotting terrorist attacks and who at times 
were under the direct control, or operating at the express behest of some foreign 
government.  These groups, moreover, had a defined set of political, social or economic 
objectives and often issued communiqués taking credit for and explaining their actions.  
Accordingly, however disagreeable or repugnant the terrorists and their tactics may have 
been, we at least knew who they were and what they wanted.  
With regard to the identifiable patterns in the choice of tactics and targets, bombs 
and guns were the favorite tools of traditional terrorist groups, with an emphasis on 
bombing.  This is because, while requiring only limited efforts and resources, bombing 
provided a good output.  Also, when used as a form of indiscriminate violence, it became 
increasing fatal and more disruptive.  With respect to targets, diplomatic, government, 
businesses area, entertainment places and economic centers, as well as military targets,  
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are currently favorite, yet indiscriminate targeting is becoming more common.  Although 
discrete targets are likely to remain the same, contemporary terrorism effects a broader 
dimension of the population than terrorism did in the past.   
Of the many possible explanations for why people become terrorists, one 
powerful view offered by terrorism studies is that men are driven to rebel by a 
combination of political repression and acute socio-economic deprivation.  Individuals 
become radicalized and vulnerable to extremist appeals when governments not only fail 
to deliver economic growth, decent jobs, adequate health care and affordable education, 
but also suppress the ensuing protest from the people in the interest of regime stability.  
Social and economic development policies also expand a new middle class in 
communities that has traditionally used the hand of terrorism to further their own 
interests.  On the other hand, in certain cases, this section of the population has 
recognized the economic benefit of peace and, as a result, has worked to inhibit local 
support for terrorist activities.  In Indonesia, for example the new middle class (and 
business elite) have emerged that directly obtained benefits from the development 
programs.  Commercial interest groups have also acted as a brake on elite business and 
loyalist violence, discouraging the retaliatory riots and attacks that traditionally occur 
during economically developing periods. 
Over the long run, Southeast Asian countries must change the political, social and 
economic milieu that breeds terrorism.  Specifically, socio-economic development in the 
Southern Philippines, economic recovery in Indonesia, the restoration of law and order in 
the Molucas and Sulawesi, and an equitable political solution to the conflicts in Aceh and 
Irian Jaya must be sought.  Internal security in Southeast Asia is poor.  Until these 
capabilities are enhanced and socio-economic deficits erased, terrorism will continue to 
flourish regardless of outside efforts to eradicate it.133            
Many terrorist organizations attract new members in communities in which 
terrorism is generally considered a viable response to perceived grievances.  Some 
terrorist groups also offer recruits financial incentives and additional family support, in 
short they offer benefits.  Social and economic development policies can help reduce the 
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pools of potential recruits by reducing their perceived grievances and by providing the 
members of these communities with viable alternatives to terrorism.  For example, two 
development projects in the southern Philippines–asparagus and banana production–have 
been particularly effective in providing economic alternatives to communities that have 
traditionally lent a high degree of support to local terrorist groups.134 
Recently, private investment has resulted in almost total employment and 
transformed an area previously known as “the killing fields of Mindanao” into a largely 
peaceful community.135  However, of course, not all terrorist recruits come from poorer 
communities.  Depending on the region and the nature of the conflict, terrorism can just 
as easily come from the middle class or upper classes.  In the countries I examined, 
extremist groups were recruited across the class spectrum, with general support from 
local communities.   
For social and economic policies to be effective, they need to be funded according 
to the relative size, geography, and needs of targeted communities.  If development 
initiatives lack sufficient financial support, they are likely to act as a double–edged 
sword, erroneously inflating the hopes and aspirations of local communities.  When their 
expectations are not met, there is an increased chance that social economic and policies 
will backfire, triggering resentment and renewed support for terrorist violence.136  Any 
one country, regardless of that nation’s power or influence within Southeast Asia, cannot 
defeat terrorist violence alone.  In order to be effective, counter-terrorism demands an 
understanding of the terrorist’s psychology, motivations and goals.137  The challenge 
presented by the region’s geography requires the shared use of counter-terrorist assets to 
include intelligence and military force as well as international cooperation in policing and 
adhering to international laws and covenants.     
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International and transnational terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah 
are violent groups that must be destroyed at their roots.  Al-Qaeda is a particularly 
dangerous adversary because it is a remarkably adaptive and nimble organization.  The 
fact that it can function on a number of different operational levels (with varying degrees 
of command and control from a central authority) also means that it does not have a 
single pre-determined modus operandi nor any single identified footprint.  This is a 
partial reflection of the organizational and operational abilities, vision, attention to detail, 
and level of planning, patience, and finally business management acumen that Osama bin 
Laden has brought to the group in his role as its charismatic leader.138 
This constellation of characteristics was clearly evident in the enormity and sheer 
scale of the simultaneous suicide attacks carried out by al-Qaeda on September 11th and 
eclipses anything we have previously seen in terrorism.  Among the most significant 
characteristics of the operation were its ambitious scope and dimension: lethal 
coordination and synchronization; and the unswerving dedication and determination of 
the aircraft hijackers who willingly and wantonly killed themselves, the passengers, and 
crews of the four aircraft they commandeered and the approximately three thousand 
persons within both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  However, not on the 
same scale, the Jemaah Islamiah accomplished a similar feast in the Bali bombing of 
October 2002.   
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States shocked the 
world and resulted in a global campaign against terrorist group.  Southeast Asian states, 
long considered the “Islamic periphery,” owing to their moderate Islamic stance, 
pluralism and nationalism, were suddenly forced to confront a small but patent terrorist 
threat in their midst, culminating in the 12 October 2002 terrorist attack on a Bali resort.  
Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda had entered the region beginning in the early to mid-1990’s, 
establishing independent cells and assisting and liaising with indigenous Islamic 
insurgencies that hitherto were believed to have solely domestic agendas.  Al-Qaeda 
penetrated the region for more than a decade beginning in 1991, and al-Qaeda emerged in 
Southeast Asia at a time when state-sponsorship was waning. 
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Although the majority of the populations in Southeast Asia are nationalist and 
tolerant, radical Islam is growing for a variety of reasons including economic diversity, 
the lack of political freedom, the spread of Wahhabism and Salafi Islam, the failure of 
secular education, and the increased number of religious students studying in Middle 
Eastern.  The main cause of radical Islam growth is the economic disparity in which a 
high gap between the rich and the poor created social jealousness.  Accordingly, these 
conditions generated the terrorist and anarchy crimes as radical efforts to achieve a better 
social life.  The specific circumstance in their respective economies was exacerbated by 
the regional economic crisis in 1997 to 1998.  The aftermath of the crisis created severe 
poverty.   
The regional economic crisis of 1997 to 1998 raised many questions concerning 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) advocacy (much proclaimed 
between 1990 and 1997) of a shift in the global order toward a “pacific century” 
premised on the association’s practices of multilateral cooperation, dialogue, consensus, 
and non-interference.  Does the aftermath of the economic crisis, and the new agenda 
posed by the forces of economic globalization and the seemingly irresolvable low 
intensity conflict that bedevils Southeast Asia requires radical re-thinking of the 
relevance of Asia’s security arrangements that are essentially the product of the Cold War 
era?  This study examined this question by considering the curious external condition in 
which ASEAN rose to international prominence, and how ASEAN erroneously came to 
be seen in the 1990’s as an apparently new form of security cooperation, and finally how 
rising levels of violent internal challenges generated by the forces of globalization 
threaten Southeast Asia’s stability.  It was quickly shown by the members of ASEAN that 
these forces have exposed ASEAN’s apparent incoherence as an imitation community 
and that it is ill equipped to contend with the threats exerted by a global information 
age.139   
Of course, the economic growth in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, has also 
generated grievances among groups whom development has left behind.  In both 
Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as in Singapore, the southern Philippines, and Southern 
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Thailand where there are sizeable Muslim minorities, these grievances have combined to 
produce Islamist movements.  Some of these radical movements seek to separate 
themselves from exploitative secular governments or to overthrow them.  Others express 
in religious terms what are in reality worldly disputes with non-Muslim communities, 
such as rivalries over land right and access to jobs and livelihood.140 
In response, Southeast Asian governments have intensified security and 
intelligence cooperation.  In this process, they have discovered that Islamist groups in the 
region have formed networks and cooperated in raising money.  One group, Jemaah 
Islamiah, wants to establish “one great Islamic State” that would incorporate Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, and the Mindanao-the Sulu region of the Philippines. 
Despite the growing concern with Islamic extremism, Southeast Asian 
governments continue to treat this threat with only some regard.  They fear that 
aggressive prosecution would radicalize more members of the Muslim community and 
render these Asian governments susceptible to charges of knuckling under to the United 
States. 
To anticipate the emergence and the growing of terrorism both in Southeast Asia 
and around the world, the actors of the security apparatus must take measures against 
terrorism by making no concessions to terrorists, bringing terrorists to justice for their 
crimes, isolating and applying pressure on the states that sponsor and support them, and 
destroying the terrorists and their organizations.  In addition, an international standard of 
accountability with regard to combating terrorism must be established and maintained. 
Cautiously, by recognizing that terrorism is caused by social and economic unrest, 
governments must eliminate the specific circumstances in their respective economies that 
fuel terrorism and must take the appropriate financial measures to prevent the flow of 
funds to terrorists, including accelerating work on combating financial crimes.  
Furthermore, all economies must adhere to relevant international requirements for the 
security of air and maritime transportation.  Transport ministers must actively and 
immediately enhance airport, aircraft, and port security.  Strengthening energy security in 
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the region through the Energy Security Initiative, which protects against temporary 
supply disruption, is also required.  Additionally, security in telecommunications, 
transportation, health and energy, must be improved.  Custom communication networks 
and expeditious development of a global integrated electronic custom networks must be 
enhanced.  This would allow customs authorities to better enforce laws while minimizing 
the impact on the flow of trade.  This could be accomplished by developing an electronic 
movement record system that will enhance border security while ensuring that legitimate 
travelers are not inconvenienced.  Economic building and technical cooperation to enable 
member economies to put into place and enforce effective counterterrorism measures is 
essential.  Cooperation to limit economic fallout from the attacks and quicker restoration 
of economic confidence in the region through policies and measures that increase 
economic growth is also imperative.  Government must also provide stable environment 
for trade, investment, travel and tourism. 
A. THE DILEMMA OF U.S. POLICY  
The diverse nature of terrorism and its association with a variety of groups and 
state sponsors preclude the design of any single counter-terrorist doctrine or strategy.  
Overreactions to terrorist events also encourage potential adversaries to take advantage of 
the U.S. preoccupation with such events to further their own interest in other regions of 
the world.  The strategy used in countering incidents that can be absorbed with minimal 
or no damage to national security should be guided by a different set of responses than 
those to incidents that truly threaten vital U.S. interests.  The first principle should be that 
U.S. initial response is relatively low-level, to avoid placing the United States at more 
risk or diverting resources needed for other functions.141  
The dilemma imposed on the United States is how to design high-level policies 
for what are essentially low-level threats.  An effective counterterrorist policy will 
require a reorientation in the way terrorism and its effects on this country are perceived.  
The following issues will have to be addressed: 
• The tendency to equate terrorism with “crisis.” 
• The roles that both the media and the government play in escalating the 
perceived terrorist threat. 
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• The possible negative long-range effects of viewing terrorism as war. 
• The need to distinguish between those terrorist incidents that may threaten 
national security or geopolitical interest and those that do not.142 
There has been a tendency on the part of both the U.S. media and recent 
administration to categorize all terrorist incidents as a crisis.  This automatically 
heightens the public’s assessment of the threat.  However, it is the reaction to terrorist 
incidents that often creates the real crisis.  The emphasis placed on searching for a 
“solution” to the problem of terrorism may put more critical security issues, such as 
regional peace efforts and relations with key allies, at risk. 
The tendency to view terrorism as “war” has also created problems in trying to 
develop an effective counterterrorist strategy.  The vast array of possible terrorist assaults 
on American citizens and facilities worldwide obviously cannot all be considered acts of 
war.  Therefore, guidelines must be formulated for determining whether a particular 
bombing, kidnapping, or hostage incident requires a military response.  One 
consideration must be the difficulty of locating and attacking those responsible for a 
terrorist incident.  Moreover, there is a strong likelihood that innocent civilians will be 
killed in the retaliation process. 
Further complicating the issue is the high probability that military preemptive or 
retaliatory strikes will cause the terrorist to respond with even greater violence or to 
attack targets of higher symbolic level.  An escalating conflict between the U.S. military 
and terrorists worldwide would cause a war that could never be won, given the multitudes 
of terrorist groups that exist and their ability to reverse any counter-terrorist progress with 
one well-placed bomb.143  
A military response, moreover, must be delivered soon after the terrorist incident 
that provokes it.  So, although a criminal investigation may continue with arrests coming 
years after the event, a military retaliation years after the event has little appeal or true 
punitive value.144   
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B. THE REALISTIC VIEW OF SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  
Will terrorism increase in Southeast Asia?  A continuing dialogue must focus on 
the nature of terrorism to permit international policy makers to move beyond the mere 
exchange of information and toward solid international cooperation.  Terrorism, however 
defined, will not disappear unless a totally oppressive state is in place, and all forms of 
expression are subject to censorship.145  Thus, the foremost principle must be the 
objective of the maintenance of the democratic process of government and the rule of 
law.146 
Perhaps the realistic view is that terrorism cannot be eradicated but merely 
contained.  In order to construct a functional policy for dealing with terrorism, there must 
be, as a first step, a program that views terrorism as impermissible violence, whatever the 
motives when directed against any civilian target.  There must also be a program that 
reduces the power of individual nations in determining those ground defenses that may be 
interposed against international terrorism extradition.  Finally the most important item, 
each nation must execute a firm, irrevocable commitment to a neutral decision making 
body that will determine all the conditions for the international extradition of terrorists.147 
Given the widespread nature of terrorism and its links to different causes and 
issues, however, the prospect of significantly reducing the threat through any single 
response is questionable.  Governments have had some measure of success in combating 
the terrorist threat within their own countries, but not worldwide.  Many western 
observers agree that realistically the United Nations is not the best forum for cooperation 
against terrorism.  In fact, from the U.S. point of view, the inability to agree on 
condemning terrorism has discredited the United Nations.  In general, the larger number 
of actors involved, the more difficult it is to achieve cooperation in any area.  This may 
already be, or may become, the problem that faces ASEAN.  Given the universal scope  
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on UN treaties, as well as the controversial nature of terrorism, it is not surprising that 
international treaties are often ineffective because of less than enthusiastic support and 
reluctant implementation. 
A set of principles is therefore necessary for an effective guide in forming 
antiterrorist policies.  The formation of policy should be based on an analysis of 
successful tactics used in the past, together with basic assumptions about the sorts of 
actions acceptable to a democratic society.  Broad policy guidelines should be capable of 
assisting decision making on a wide range of diverse policy issues.  
A practical approach to isolating terrorism should focus on its unacceptable action 
regardless of the political cause it supports.  The point should be made (and repeated) that 
no cause is well served by terrorism, which can only fail as a means of bringing about 
long term political change.  Terrorism is most often damaging to the hopes of those who 
use it, not only because it provokes government repression but also because terrorism 
unites the public against it and brings a hard response.  Terrorism, thought difficult to 
precisely differentiate from other forms of violence, should be discredited as a method.  
Terrorism makes a tremendous noise, but compared to full-scale war it seems almost 
irrelevant.  The danger of the regional and international terrorism, in other words, is not 
in the terrorist acts themselves, but in their potential to trigger wider and more dangerous 
armed conflicts.  For this reason, it is important to prevent escalation, to resist state-
sponsored terrorism from the beginning, and to avoid leading its sponsors into an even 
worse temptation. 
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